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Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in the Federal Courts
by
DONALD H. ZEIGLER*
Introduction
The principle that legal rights must have remedies is fundamental to
democratic government.1 In a democracy, legal rights define social rela-
tions and promote human well-being in the broadest sense. Justice re-
quires their enforcement. The principle is so obviously correct that
assent to it is instinctive.
Nonetheless, rights are not always enforced in the United States. It
has become increasingly difficult to enforce legal rights in federal court.
In fact, the chief legacy of the Burger Court may be the creation of im-
pediments to the enforcement of rights. Cases that restrict access to the
federal courts for the vindication of constitutional rights against state
official action are clear examples of such obstructions, 2 but they are only
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D. 1969,
Columbia University. The author wishes to thank Donald L. Doernberg for his helpful com-
ments on a draft of this Article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the comments and
suggestions of Harry H. Wellington and the participants in the New York Law School faculty
scholarship seminar. Finally, the author acknowledges the research assistance of Herbert
Lazar.
1. This Article defines a legal right in Hohfeldian terms. A legal right is one that im-
poses a correlative duty on another to act or refrain from acting for the benefit of the person
holding the right. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-38 (W. Cook
ed. 1919).
2. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 667 (1986) (due process clause not
implicated by a state official's negligent act causing unintended loss of life, liberty, or prop-
erty); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983) (denying standing to plaintiffs seeking to
enforce federal constitutional rights); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (extending
absolute immunity to state judges in cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions
undertaken in their official capacities); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (restrict-
ing the scope of federal habeas corpus); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (same); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (defamation by police officials not a deprivation of liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431
(1976) (extending absolute immunity to state prosecutors in § 1983 cases for actions under-
taken in the course of their official duties); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 (1976) (deny-
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part of a broader pattern of decisions that impede enforcement of statu-
tory and common-law rights. 3 In most instances, the Court has not di-
luted the content or substance of rights directly; instead it has created
procedural barriers that leave victims without a practical remedy.4 Con-
gress has not responded to the erection of these barriers, leaving theoreti-
cally established legal rights unenforced.
This Article asserts that the federal courts must change this pattern.
They must vindicate rights fully and effectively. The Article suggests a
new approach to the enforcement of rights that would accomplish this
goal, and it provides examples of how the approach should be applied.
Section I demonstrates the importance of the principle that rights
must have remedies. It traces the history of this principle, showing its
critical role in the development of our legal institutions. Section I also
explains why rights should have remedies and discusses some general
limitations on the principle.
Section II sets forth the new framework for the enforcement of
rights. It argues that courts must begin with a presumption in favor of
enforcement that can be overcome only by an affirmative showing that
the harm from enforcement is greater than the harm to the plaintiff from
the denial of his rights. Section II applies the new approach to two major
impediments to the enforcement of rights in the federal courts-the ab-
stention doctrines and the new restrictive standards for implication of
private rights of action under federal statutes-and concludes that the
Supreme Court should abandon or greatly restrict the abstention doc-
ing standing); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974) (same); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (applying abstention doctrine restricting access to federal courts in constitu-
tional cases); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (same).
3. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers' Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. I,
27-28 (1983) (extending the well-pleaded complaint rule to deny federal subject matter juris-
diction over a case involving federal statutory issues); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 332 (1981) (holding that congressional enactment of amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1376 (1982), displaced federal common law in the
area of water pollution); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979)
(implication of private right of action under federal statute requires clear showing of congres-
sional intent to provide private relief); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
(1979) (same); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976) (denying
standing to plaintiffs asserting violation of federal statutory rights); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 518 (1975) (same); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-79 (1974) (restricting
the use of federal class actions in cases seeking to enforce federal securities and antitrust laws);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (construing the eleventh amendment to forbid
federal courts from ordering states to make retroactive payment of welfare benefits wrongly
withheld under federal regulations).
4. This Article does not address Supreme Court decisions that decline to extend legal
protection to human or moral rights. Instead, it focuses on impediments to enforcement of
established legal rights.
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trines and return to the traditional standards for implication of private
remedies. Finally, section II suggests steps that Congress should take if
the Court fails to make the necessary changes.
I. The Importance of the Principle that
Rights Require Remedies
A. The History of the Principle
The ancient idea that rights must have remedies has played a signifi-
cant role in English and American legal history. This subsection ex-
plores a number of areas in which the principle substantially influenced
the growth of the law in the past and suggests that the federal courts
should give it greater consideration in the future. The areas chosen relate
directly to the barriers to the enforcement of rights discussed in section
II. Thus, this subsection also provides background that is helpful in ana-
lyzing these barriers. Three major developments are discussed: the rise
of equity, the merger of law and equity with the corresponding develop-
ment of new codes of procedure, and the development of tort actions for
the violation of statutory rights.
(1) The Rise of Equity
Chancery courts developed because the common-law courts often
did not provide complete and effective redress of legal wrongs. 5 Short-
comings in common-law procedure severely limited the capacity of the
common-law courts to vindicate rights and necessitated development of a
supplementary remedial system. Common-law pleading rules were rigid
and technical, and required parties to enforce their rights through pre-
scribed forms of action.6 If the facts of a case did not fit a form precisely,
the plaintiff was remediless. 7 Cases were limited to resolution of a single
5. G. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUS-
TICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 9 (9th ed. 1917); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398 (7th ed. 1956); F. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 4-6 (1932); 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE 20, 31 5th ed. 1941); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 30-32, 53 (1836).
6. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 397, 447; 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at 22-24;
H. POTrER, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 497
(1932).
7. G. BISPHAM, supra note 5, at 9 ("Certain precise and rigid forms of action existed,
which were supposed to effectually carry out the great maxim of justice, ubijus ibi remedium
[where the law gives a right, it also gives a remedy], but which . . . were not sufficiently
comprehensive to do so."); 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at 28; H. POTTER, supra note 6, at 137
("If the facts of a particular case were such that [the forms of action were inappropriate] the
injured party was without a remedy."); I J. STORY, supra note 5, at 26.
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issue between only two adverse claimants. 8 Judgment was simply for the
plaintiff or for the defendant; a common-law court could not grant condi-
tional relief or impose reciprocal duties.9 In addition, common-law
courts awarded only damages. They could not order a defendant to per-
form an act or fulfill an obligation. The courts thus could not prevent
wrongs; at best they could only provide compensation.' 0 Finally, com-
mon-law judges gave precedent so much weight that change to accom-
modate new circumstances was difficult."
Suitors unable to obtain justice in the common-law courts turned to
the king and his chancellor for assistance.' 2 Initially, the chancellor sim-
ply invented a new writ and sent the petitioner back to the common-law
courts for a remedy. 13 During the fourteenth century, however, the in-
creasingly conservative common-law judges quashed new writs that dif-
fered materially from those traditionally used. Chancery, in turn,
gradually developed its own, less formal procedures for resolving contro-
versies without resort to the common-law courts. 14 These equity rules
were less technical and better able to accommodate varying fact pat-
terns. 15 Equity courts could grant injunctive relief and tailor remedies to
balance the rights of the parties. 16 Equity courts allowed more liberal
joinder of claims and parties, enabling them to settle all claims arising
from a controversy. 17 Equity also provided relief from common-law
judgments based on fraud, mistake, or breach of trust.'8
The equity courts thus enabled the English legal system to provide
more complete remedies for violations of legal rights. It became a maxim
of equity jurisprudence that "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without
8. G. CLARK, EQUITY 4-5 (1954); H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY 21 (1948). Indeed, the eventual production of a single issue was the principal goal
of common-law pleading. H. STEPHEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS
* 136-37, 147-50.
9. G. BISPHAM, supra note 5, at 9-10; G. CLARK, supra note 8, at 4; 1 J. STORY, supra
note 5, at 26-27.
10. G. CLARK, supra note 8, at 4-5; W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQurrY 5
(2d ed. 1956); H. POTTER, supra note 6, at 498; 1 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 29.
11. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at 20-21. Pomeroy summed up the shortcomings of the
common-law system by stating that "the common law furnished a very meager system of rem-
edies, utterly insufficient for the needs of a civilization advancing beyond the domination of
feudal ideas." Id. at 31; see also 1 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 53-55.
12. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 399, 401-03; F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 4-5.
13. F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Id.
15. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 449.
16. 1 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 27.
17. G. CLARK, supra note 8, at 4; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 21.
18. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 5; 1 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 28, 30.
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a remedy."' 19 The principle expressed in this maxim lay at the heart of
equity because it was the very reason for Chancery's existence.20
(2) The Merger of Law and Equity and the Development of
New Codes of Procedure
During the nineteenth century, law and equity merged and new
codes of civil procedure were enacted in England and many American
jurisdictions.21 These changes occurred so that legal rights could be bet-
ter enforced. Although the Court of Chancery had developed to vindi-
cate rights, in time it had become less able to serve this purpose
effectively. As equity became a formal system, with binding precedents,
settled procedures, and its own bureaucracy, it lost the discretion and
flexibility that enabled it to do justice in individual cases. 22 As Chancery
came more to resemble the common-law courts, it developed similar
problems.23 Equity became merely a competing legal system, and thus
insured its own downfall. 24
19. R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (27th ed. 1973); see also
G. BISPHAM, supra note 5, at 56; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 8, at 76; 2 J. POMEROY, supra
note 5, at 185. Pomeroy describes the maxim as an equitable application of the more compre-
hensive legal maxim. Id.
20. See, e.g., G. BISPHAM, supra note 5, at 56 ("The principle expressed by this maxim is,
indeed, the foundation of equitable jurisdiction, because... that jurisdiction had its rise in the
inability of the common-law courts to meet the requirements of justice."); R. MEGARRY & P.
BAKER, supra note 19, at 27-28 ("The idea expressed in this maxim... really underlies the
whole jurisdiction of equity [because] the common law courts failed to remedy many un-
doubted wrongs, and this failure led to the establishment of the Court of Chancery."); 2 J.
POMEROY, supra note 5, at 185 ("This principle... is the source of the entire equitable juris-
diction . . ").
21. General surveys of the merger process in the United States and descriptions of the
different forms that merger took can be found in 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 5, at 44-55, 633-47,
and in Ingersoll, Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J. 58, 58-71 (1911). For a detailed
account of the adoption of new procedural codes in the United States, see C. HEPBURN, THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 87-152
(1897); see also C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 23-31 (2d ed. 1947).
22. H. POrER, supra note 6, at 511, 528; Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L.
REV. 20, 24-26 (1905); Severns, Equity and "Fusion" in Illinois, 18 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 333,
339 (1940).
23. R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, supra note 19, at 10; Emmerglick, A Century of the New
Equity, 23 TEx. L. REV. 244, 245 (1945). Serious administrative problems hampered the
Court of Chancery during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The judicial
staff was inadequate, the clerks were sometimes corrupt, and the chancellor did not supervise
the officials carefully. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 423-28. In addition, the relatively
simple procedures of early equity had become highly technical and complex. H. POrER,
supra note 6 at 531-32. Potter concludes that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
Court of Chancery "was in a state of nearly hopeless confusion." Id. at 530.
24. See Pound, supra note 22, at 25; see also M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
261 (1967) ("Hence, legal history shows.., periodic waves of reform during which the sense
of justice, natural law, or equity introduces life and flexibility into the law and makes it adjust-
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In both England and America, the existence of two separate court
systems caused inconvenience and confusion. 25 It often was unclear
which system should hear an action,26 and a wrong choice could defeat
the plaintiff's claim, or at least cost time and money.2 7 Moreover, in
many instances neither system could give the complete relief that justice
required. The common-law courts could give only limited injunctive re-
lief, and the equity courts normally could not award damages.28 Conse-
quently, litigants often were forced to use both systems to resolve a single
controversy. 29 A primary purpose of the merger of law and equity was to
combine equitable and legal remedies so that litigants could obtain com-
plete relief in a single lawsuit.30
State legislatures also enacted new codes of civil procedure to ensure
the vindication of rights. One commentator said of the code movement:
Its one great purpose was to bring procedure into a simple and natural
relation with substantive law... [and] to give a natural and vigorous
vitality to a maxim which the law had long placed before itself as the
ideal-wherever a right, there a remedy. 31
Common-law pleading requirements had remained technical and ab-
struse,32 and the forms of action continued to complicate and restrict
able to its work. In course of time, however, under the social demand for certainty, equity gets
hardened and reduced to rigid rules, so that, after a while, a new reform wave is necessary.").
25. Pound, supra note 22, at 23; Taylor, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 66 U. PA. L.
REV. 17, 23 (1917).
26. C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 45; Field, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the
Courts?, in 1 D. FIELD, SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD 254 (A. Sprague ed. 1884); Taylor, supra note 25, at 23.
27. Field, First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, in 1 D. FIELD,
supra note 26, at 266; Severns, supra note 22, at 344, 355.
28. C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 45-46; R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, supra note 19, at
11-12.
29. C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 45-46; R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, supra note 19, at
11-12; Field, supra note 26, at 254.
30. Walsh, Merger of Law and Equity Under Codes and Other Statutes, 6 N.Y.U. L. REv.
157, 165 (1929). For a discussion of the problem of achieving effective merger of law and
equity, see Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1925); Severns, supra
note 22, at 347-55. For accounts of the belated merger of law and equity in the federal courts,
see Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261 (1939); Holtzoff, Equita-
ble and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New Federal Procedure, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 127
(1943). For careful accounts of the problems caused by the separation of law and equity in the
federal courts, see Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL L.Q.
443, 451-55 (1935); Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 44 YALE L.J. 387,
415-35 (1935).
31. C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 21.
32. Field, supra note 26, at 235; see C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 18, 43, 58-59; E.
SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CODE PLEADING 3-4 (2d ed. 1940).
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legal claims. 33 In addition, common-law limitations on joinder of claims
and parties often necessitated several lawsuits to settle one controversy. 34
New York led the reform efforts. In 1846 a new state constitution
abolished the Court of Chancery and directed the legislature to appoint
commissioners to "revise, reform, simplify, and abridge" New York's
procedural rules.35 In 1847, the legislature appointed the commissioners
and instructed them to
provide for the abolition of the present forms of actions and pleadings,
in cases at common law; for a uniform course of proceedings in all
cases whether of legal or equitable cognizance, and for the abandon-
ment ... of any form or proceeding not necessary to ascertain or pre-
serve the rights of the parties. 36
New York enacted its new code of civil procedure in 1848.37 The code
merged law and equity, abolished the forms of action, and created one
form of action denominated a civil action "for the enforcement or protec-
tion of private rights and the redress of private wrongs."'38 The code also
liberalized the rules for the joinder of claims and parties.39 The New
York code subsequently became the prototype for other state codes. 0
(3) Tort Actions on Statutes
The principle that rights require remedies prompted other impor-
tant developments in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Tort actions in
which courts approved an amount of damages for violation of a statutory
duty even though the statute did not explicitly authorize a damage rem-
edy provide a further example of this principle at work.41 The courts
33. C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 46-51; E. SUNDERLAND, supra note 32, at 4; Field,
supra note 27, at 266-67.
34. C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 51-57; E. SUNDERLAND, supra note 32, at 4; Field,
supra note 27, at 268.
35. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 24.
36. 1847 N.Y. Laws ch. 59, § 8.
37. 1848 N.Y. Laws ch. 379. The code is commonly known as the Field Code, after
David Dudley Field, who was the most influential of the commissioners appointed by the
legislature. C. CLARK, supra note 21, at 22; J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J.
SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 428 (4th ed. 1985). For a detailed ac-
count of the development of the Field Code, see Coe & Morse, Chronology of the Development
of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942).
38. 1848 N.Y. Laws, ch. 379, § 62.
39. Field, supra note 26, at 267-68.
40. See C. HEPBURN, supra note 21, at 87-152; see also C. CLARK, supra note 21, at 23-
31.
41. Fricke, The Juridical Nature of the Action on the Statute, 76 LAW Q. REV. 240, 240
(1960); Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in
Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968). The purpose of a tort action is to compensate a
person for injuries caused by another. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984). Originally, tortious injury was redressable by two writs: one for
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reasoned that where there is a right, there must be a remedy.
' Ashby v. White 42 is an early example. The plaintiff sought damages,
claiming that an official had improperly denied him the right to vote in a
parliamentary election. Chief Justice Holt noted that an ancient statute
gave the plaintiff the right to vote, and concluded that a remedy should
be given even though the statute failed to provide one:
A right that a man has to give his vote at the election of a person to
represent him in Parliament... is a most transcendant thing, and of a
high nature .... The right of voting [is] so great a privilege, that it is a
great injury to deprive the plaintiff of it....
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to
vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise
or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right
without a remedy ....
Where a new Act of Parliament is made for the benefit of the
subject, if a man be hindered from the enjoyment of it, he shall have
an action against such person who so obstructed him.... [B]y West. 1,
3 Ed. 1, c.5, it is enacted, that for as much as elections ought to be free,
the king forbids, upon grievous forfeiture, that any... man... shall
disturb to make free election.... [A]nd if the Parliament thought the
freedom of elections to be a matter of that consequence, as to give their
sanction to it, and to enact that they should be free; it is a violation of
that statute, to disturb the plaintiff in this case in giving his vote at an
election, and consequently actionable. 43
Thus, Chief Justice Holt thought that the plaintiff should be allowed to
proceed.44
Couch v. Steel 45 elaborated on the traditional standards governing
actions on statutes. The plaintiff, a seaman on the defendant's ship, be-
trespass, the other for trespass on the case. Id. at 29. An action for trespass was the remedy
for direct and forcible injuries; an action on the case was the remedy for indirect injuries. Id.
at 29-30. Actions on statutes originated in 1285 when the Statute of Westminster II author-
ized an action on the case for those aggrieved by neglect of statutory duty. Couch v. Steel, 118
Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q.B. 1854); Fricke, supra, at 240. The statute read: "Moreover, con-
cerning the Statutes provided where the Law faileth, and for Remedies, lest suitors coming to
the King's Court should depart from thence without Remedy, they shall have Writs provided
in their Cases .... " 13 Edw. ch. 50, § 2 (1285).
42. 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703).
43. Id. at 135-37 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
44. Initially, the majority decided for the defendant, arguing, inter alia, that the offense
was a public one and therefore no action should lie, that the case involved a legislative matter
that should be left to Parliament to decide, and that the plaintiff could show no actual pecuni-
ary loss. Id. at 129-33. Subsequently, however, Chief Justice Holt's dissenting opinion was
accepted by the House of Lords and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. Id. at 138. For
other early decisions in accord with Chief Justice Holt's opinion, see Rowning v. Goodchild,
96 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1773); Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (Q.B. 1703); Turner v. Sterling,
86 Eng. Rep. 287, 289 (K.B. 1683); North v. Musgrave, 82 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B. 1639).
45. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854).
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came ill on a voyage from England to Calcutta. He sued, claiming that
the defendant had failed to comply with a statute that required all Eng-
lish ships to keep on board "a sufficient supply of medicines suitable to
accidents and diseases arising on sea voyages."' 46 The statute provided
that a shipowner could be fined twenty pounds at the suit of any person,
with the fine paid in part to the person who reported the infraction and in
part to the Seaman's Hospital Society, but it made no provision for a
damage action to compensate an injured seaman. 47 Nonetheless, the
court held that the plaintiff's action could go forward.48
Lord Campbell began his opinion by noting that if the statute had
provided no sanctions at all, the plaintiff's suit plainly could be main-
tained. The general rule, he stated, was that a person could institute an
action when he was injured by breach of a statute enacted for his benefit,
and the plaintiff clearly fit within this rule.49 The legislature's imposition
of a specific sanction, however, raised a question as to whether a court
could order a different remedy. In answering the question, Lord Camp-
bell drew a distinction between public and private wrongs. The statutory
penalty was imposed for the public wrong, and did not go to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the statute did not abrogate the plaintiff's common-law cause
of action to seek compensation for his private or personal injuries.50
Lord Campbell added some qualifications. If a statute provided one
mode of compensation for the private wrong, a court would not author-
ize another. And if the legislature specifically abrogated a common-law
cause of action, a plaintiff could not recover.5 1
Tort actions for violation of statutory duties were common in Amer-
ican state courts in the late 1800s and early 1900s.52 Courts allowed
private remedies for the violation of a statute containing other sanctions
46. Id. at 1196.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1198.
49. Id. Lord Campbell cited the Statute of Westminster II, ch. 50, see supra note 41, and
J. COMYNS, DIGEST 268 (1762) ("[lIn every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing
for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted
for his advantage, or for recompence of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.").
50. Couch, 118 Eng. Rep. at 1197.
51. A court also could not provide additional penalties for the public wrong beyond those
provided by the statute. Id. Not all English cases from this era are in accord with Ashby and
Couch. See, eg., Stevens v. Jeacocke, 116 Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (Q.B. 1848) (imposition of a
penalty precluded a private remedy); Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks & Gateshead Co., 2
Ex. D. 441, 444 (1877) (questioning Couch).
52. See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103,41 N.W. 543 (1889); Schell v. Dubois,
94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916); Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co., 220 Pa. 617, 69 A.
1116 (1908). See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, at 220-34, for extensive citations
to such cases.
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if the statute was intended for the benefit of a class of persons of which
the plaintiff was a member rather than for the public generally, and if the
harm suffered was of a kind the statute generally was intended to pre-
vent. 53 If these conditions were satisfied, the majority rule was that vio-
lation of the statutory duty was negligence per se, and the plaintiff was
entitled to have the jury so instructed.54 The reason given for this liberal
remedial regime was that where there is a right, there should be a
remedy.55
Legislative intent played an important role in the early cases. The
requirements that the statute be enacted for the plaintiff's benefit and
aimed at preventing the sort of harm that actually occurred ensured that
a private remedy was consistent with underlying legislative purposes.
And, as both Lord Campbell and Dean Prosser made clear, a court
would provide a private remedy even if the legislature was silent on the
matter.56 A court would refuse a private remedy only if the legislature
53. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, at 192-97. These standards were incorpo-
rated in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934):
Violations Creating Civil Liability.
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing
to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if-
the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other
as an individual; and the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to
protect; and, where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular
hazard, the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and, the violation is a
legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted himself as to disable
himself from maintaining an action.
54. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, at 229-30; Fricke, supra note 41, at 242;
Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1041, 1048 (1960). For support
of the majority rule, see Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317, 321-
26 (1914). For criticisms, see Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16
MINN. L. REv. 361, 365-76 (1932), and Fricke, supra note 41, at 242-44. The development of
the theory that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence per se is discussed in Foy,
SomAe Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and
Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 540-48 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116, 120 (1883) ("The fact that there was a
penalty imposed by the statute for neglect of duty in regard to the railing and protection of the
elevator well does not exonerate those responsible therefor from such liability."); Stout v.
Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 186 (Mich. 1845) ("It is a general principle of the common law, that
whenever the law gives a right, or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action; and,
where no specific remedy is given for an injury complained of, a remedy may be had by special
action on the case."); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 171-72, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920)
(Cardozo, J.) ("A statute designed for the protection of human life is not to be brushed aside as
a form of words, its commands reduced to the level of cautions, and the duty to obey attenu-
ated into an option to conform.").
56. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, at 220-21; see supra note 49 and accom-
panying text.
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explicitly barred the remedy or made clear its intention to substitute
other relief.
Until quite recently, the federal courts generally followed traditional
standards in providing remedies for violation of statutory duties.5 7 For
example, in Hayes v. Michigan Central Railroad,58 the plaintiff was a
young boy whose left arm was severed by the defendant's train. He sued
for damages in federal court, claiming that the defendant had violated a
Chicago ordinance granting the railroad a right of way on the condition
that it erect fences along the rail line to protect persons and property
from danger.5 9 The defendant conceded that it might be sued by the city
for breach of the ordinance, but argued that the violation could not be a
basis of civil liability to a private plaintiffi ° The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, holding that because the city had enacted the ordinance to pro-
tect people from injury, "each person specially injured by the breach of
the obligation is entitled to his individual compensation [by] an action for
its recovery. ' 61 The Court reached a similar result in Texas & Pacific
Railway v. Rigsby.62 The plaintiff, a switchman for the Railway Com-
pany, was injured while descending from the top of a boxcar when a
defective handhold gave way. He sued for damages under a federal stat-
ute requiring trains in interstate commerce to have secure handholds.
The Court held that the plaintiff could recover under the statute even
though it did not contain express language conferring a right of action
for injury to employees:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the
party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law
expressed ... in these words: "So, in every case, where a statute enacts,
or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy
upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for
the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law." (Per
Holt, C.J., Anon., 6 Mod. 26, 27.) This is but an application of the
maxim, Ubijus ibi remedium. See 3 Black. Com. 51, 123; Couch v.
Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 411; 23 L.J.Q.B. 121, 125.63
57. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-75 (1982)
("[F]ederal courts, following a common-law tradition, regarded the denial of a remedy as the
exception rather than the rule.") (footnote omitted). The recent, more restrictive standards are
discussed in section II.B., infra.
58. 111 U.S. 228 (1884).
59. Id. at 229-30.
60. Id. at 233.
61. Id. at 240.
62. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
63. Id. at 39-40.
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After Rigsby, the federal courts often allowed or "implied" remedies
for violations of statutory duties when the statute did not explicitly au-
thorize a private right of action.64 A period of particular hospitality to
the implication of private rights of action in the 1960s65 was followed by
a period of extreme hostility in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 66 Histori-
cally, however, tort actions on statutes provided a clear example of the
common law striving to provide remedies for the violation of rights.67
64. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "the Rigsby approach prevailed throughout
most of our history." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
375 (1982). For examples of cases implying rights of action under traditional standards after
Rigsby, see Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 571 (1930) (up-
holding injunction enforcing Railway Labor Act prohibition against employer interference
with employee organizational activity); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499,
501 (2d Cir. 1956) (private right of action allowed for racial discrimination in violation of
Federal Aviation Act); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) (private
right of action allowed for interception of a telephone conversation in violation of Federal
Communications Act); Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761, 763 (N.D.
Ohio 1929) (farmer injured by dirigible flying unreasonably low in violation of federal regula-
tions allowed to bring suit); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) (implied right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
If the common-law requirements for implying rights of action could not be met, the courts
denied relief. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 376 ("During the years prior to 1975, the Court
occasionally refused to recognize an implied remedy, either because the statute in question was
a general regulatory prohibition enacted for the benefit of the public at large, or because there
was evidence that Congress intended an express remedy to provide the exclusive method of
enforcement."). For examples of such cases, see T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464,
480 (1959) (refusing to imply right of action under Motor Carrier Act); Montana-Dakota
Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 254 (1951) (no damage action allowed
in suit by one public utility against another for charging unreasonable rates in violation of the
Federal Power Act); Consolidated Freightways v. United Truck Lines, 216 F.2d 543, 548 (9th
Cir. 1954) (no cause of action for a trucking concern injured by rival operating without certifi-
cate in violation of Motor Carrier Act), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
65. See e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) (quoting
Rigsby and stating that the "existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary
and appropriate remedies" in creating a damage remedy for racial discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1982); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964) (recognizing a private
right of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on the grounds that
creation of remedies to vindicate federal statutory rights is a proper role for the federal courts).
66. See e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981) (private right of action
will be implied only upon a clear showing of congressional intent to create a right of action);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (same); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (same). The new restrictive standards for implication
of private rights of action are analyzed in Section II.B., infra.
67. Supreme Court reliance on the principle that rights should have remedies has not
been limited to actions on the statute. For example, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), petitioner brought a mandamus action to compel the Secretary of State to deliver a
commission appointing petitioner to the bench. Chief Justice Marshall cited the "general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action
at law, whenever that right is invaded." Id. at 163 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES 23). He continued: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed
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This experience, as well as the rise of equity, the merger of law and
equity, and the code movement, amply demonstrate that the principle
that rights require remedies has played an important role in the develop-
ment of Anglo-American legal institutions.68
B. Why Rights Should Have Remedies, and Some General Limitations on
the Principle
The principle that rights require remedies prompted the far-reach-
ing developments in our legal history discussed in the previous subsec-
tion. Remarkably, however, the historical sources contain almost no
discussion of why rights should have remedies.69 Perhaps the legislators
and judges who relied upon the principle considered the reasons obvious.
a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Id.
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), also was a mandamus action,
seeking payment from the Postmaster General for performance of a contract to deliver mail.
In granting relief, the Court stated:
It cannot be denied but that congress had the power to command that act to be done;
and the power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will
present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well
organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeni-
able right should be shown to exist.
Id. at 624.
68. One other development demonstrating the importance of the principle in American
history deserves brief mention. The constitutions of approximately three-fourths of the states
contain a provision requiring that rights have remedies. Note, Constitutional Guarantees of a
Certain Remedy, 49 IOwA L. REv. 1202, 1202 (1964); see, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. 11 ("Every
subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws,
for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought
to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and
without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws."); S.C. CoNsT. art.
1, § 15 ("All Courts shall be public, and every person shall have speedy remedy therein for
wrongs sustained."); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every person for
an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law.").
Most of the provisions are of ancient origin and little legislative history exists explaining
the intentions of the framers. Note, supra, at 1203-04. Not surprisingly, therefore, the states
interpret the provisions differently:
The result has been constructions which vary, on the one hand, from those which
view the provision's purpose as merely guaranteeing an aggrieved individual his day
in court, preventing the legislature from barring from court anyone who possesses a
legal right protectable under an established remedy, or assuring that legally recog-
nized wrongs will be remediable, to those which, at the other extreme, see it as com-
pelling a court to create a new remedy for a wrong for which the legislature has
provided none.
Id. at 1204 (citations omitted). Despite varying interpretations, the constitutional provisions
are further evidence of the importance in American history of the principle that rights must
have remedies.
69. In all the materials reviewed, only Chief Justice Holt hinted at a reason when he said
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At the risk of belaboring the obvious, this subsection will address the
question and will explore some general limitations on the principle.
To begin, a right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a
hope or a wish. This follows from the definition of a legal right adopted
at the beginning of this Article.70 In Hohfeldian terms, a right entails a
correlative duty to act or refrain from acting for the benefit of another
person.71 Unless a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty; 'it is only
a voluntary obligation that a person can fulfill or not at his whim.72 In
such circumstances, the holder of the correlative "right" can only hope
that the act or forbearance will occur. Thus, a right without a remedy is
simply not a legal right. 73
To understand why it is important for legal claims to be enforceable
to be rights-rather than mere requests for favors-it is necessary to ex-
plore the purposes of rights. Rights define social relations.74 They serve
as means to very important ends. 75 Rights promote well-being in the
broadest sense.76 They secure the dignity and the integrity of human
"[w]here a man has but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his right."
Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (K.B. 1703).
70. See supra note 1.
71. W. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 38.
72. As Justice Holmes once remarked, "Legal obligations that exist but cannot be en-
forced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp." The Western
Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
73. A number of jurisprudential scholars accept this conclusion. See, e.g., T. BENDrrr,
RIGHTS 51 (1982) ("[O]ne can't say that he has a right, then and there, to do something if he is
not permitted, then and there, to do it. Another way of putting this is to say that a right
doesn't exist if one can't act on it (or insist on it)."); J. FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 141 (1980) ("Why is the right to demand recognition of one's rights so
important? The reason, I think, is that if one begged, pleaded, or prayed for recognition
merely, at best one would receive a kind of beneficent treatment easily confused with the ac-
knowledgement of rights, but in fact altogether foreign and deadly to it."); J. GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 8 (1938); I. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF
LAW 254-55 (1980) ("The doctrine of legal rights teaches us that declarations of rights are
vain without an effective apparatus to implement them.").
Some writers include the element of enforceability in their definition of legal rights. See,
e.g., M. GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 74 (1965) ("Legal rights are claims enforceable at
law."); I. JENKINS, supra, at 247 ("Natural rights are merely claims, regardless of the intellec-
tual justification and emotional fervor with which they are pressed. Legal rights give title,
backed by force."); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 110 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
("It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a
penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than
advice or recommendations.").
74. M. GINSBERG, supra note 73, at 76.
75. I. JENKINS, supra note 73, at 243.
76. M. GINSBERG, supra note'73, at 75; I. JENKINS, supra note 73, at 243; A. WHITE,
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beings.77 They enable people to grow, to develop, to fulfill their aspira-
tions, 78 and to accumulate necessary material goods. 79 Rights give peo-
ple control over their lives80 and are essential to self-respect.81 Theories
of rights often are considered to conflict with social utility because recog-
nizing rights is sometimes inefficient.82 Nonetheless, legal rights plainly
serve some utilitarian purposes. They assist society in treating people
equally.8 3 They also promote order and predictability, thus enabling
people to act upon reasonable expectations in managing their affairs.8 4
Having described the purposes of rights, it is relatively easy to envi-
sion the consequences of their inadequate enforcement. The dignity of
the individual is diminished and people are less able to achieve their
goals. People feel insecure and they lose self-respect.85 If the legal sys-
tem tells a person that it is acceptable for his rights to be violated, the
implicit message is that the person lacks worth.8 6 And, when the system
vindicates another person's rights in similar circumstances, the message
is that the other person has greater worth. When denial of rights occurs
systematically over time, the result is alienation, isolation, anger, and
RIGHTS 100 (1984); MacCormick, Rights, Claims and Remedies, 1 LAW & PHIL. 337, 338
(1982).
77. I. JENKINS, supra note 73, at 243; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in RIGHTS 104
(D. Lyons ed. 1979); McCloskey, Respect for Human Moral Rights Versus Maximizing Good,
in UTILIrY AND RIGHTS 126 (R. Frey ed. 1984).
78. I. JENKINS, supra note 73, at 243; McCloskey, supra note 77, at 126.
79. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978); Kelsen, The Law as a Specific Social
Technique, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 75, 81 (1941); Ryan, Utility and Ownership, in UTILITY AND
RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 175.
80. N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 41 (1982); Griffin, To-
wards a Substantive Theory of Rights, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 140.
81. J. FEINBERG, supra note 73, at 142, 148; N. MACCORMICK, supra note 80, at 39-41;
Buchanan, What's So Special About Rights?, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 63 (E. Paul, F.
Miller & J. Paul eds. 1985); Dworkin, supra note 77, at 105.
82. Frey, Utilitarianism and Persons, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 3;
Mackie, Rights, Utility, and Universalization, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 86.
83. M. GINSBERG, supra note 73, at 79-80; Dworkin, supra note 77, at 105. Griffin, supra
note 80, at 143, 150; Lyons, Introduction to RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 12-13. Equal regard and
equal treatment are, of course, "notoriously indeterminate." Griffin, supra note 80, at 143.
Despite disagreement as to what equality of treatment should entail in various contexts, it is an
important purpose of rights.
84. Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and Fairness, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 144 (J. Waldron ed. /
1984) ("One common view of the place of rights, and moral rules generally, within utilitarian-
ism holds that they are useful as means to the co-ordination of action."); Wasserstrom, Rights,
Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination, in RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 49 ("To live in a
society ... in which rights are generally respected is to live in a society in which the social
environment has been made appreciably more predictable and secure.").
85. J. FEINBERG, supra note 73, at 142; Buchanan, supra note 81, at 63.
86. J. FEINBERG, supra note 73, at 151; Dworkin, supra note 77, at 105-06.
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fear.8 7 In extreme cases, the result is totalitarianism or chaos.
Fortunately, the United States is not the extreme case. Most of our
rights are not violated most of the time. The threat of sanction deters
violations and people often voluntarily fulfill their legal duties. Addition-
ally, many rights are enforced; they have remedies. Although enforce-
ment is never absolute, total nonenforcement is relatively rare.88
Despite the importance of the enforcement of rights, in some situa-
tions rights cannot have remedies. When two rights conflict, vindication
of one necessarily entails limitation of the other.8 9 Rights must be bal-
anced and thus circumscribed. In some circumstances enforcing rights
would seriously harm individuals or interfere with a compelling govern-
mental interest. For example, the right to freedom of speech cannot en-
compass a right to cry "Fire" in a crowded theater.90 Similarly, a
person's right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before govern-
mental seizure of his property cannot be enforced if immediate seizure is
necessary to protect the public health, as in the case of misbranded drugs
or contaminated food. 91 In addition, the legal system has its own limits
and may afford a defendant an affirmative defense, such as res judicata
or the statute of limitations. 92 Thus, even though a plaintiff's right was
violated, if he previously litigated the matter and lost, the legal system
will preclude relitigation in the interest of finality. Or, if a person waits
too long to seek a remedy, the system will extinguish the right in fairness
to the defendant and to satisfy society's interest in repose.
Additionally, the legal system is inherently limited in its capacity to
vindicate rights. Application of law in individual cases is necessarily im-
perfect. The legal process cannot always accurately ascertain objective
fact. A trial may distort the past or reconstruct it incofipletely. Wit-
nesses may misperceive, or forget, or lie. Courts and juries may apply
87. Cf J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 26 (1983); Gray, The Costs of Crime: Re-
view and Overview, in THE COSTS OF CRIME 13, 20-22 (C. Gray ed. 1979) (asserting that crime
causes a breakdown in the sense of community by making people wary of their neighbors and
reluctant to venture beyond their locked doors).
88. Cf I. JENKINS, supra note 73, at 22 ("Order is never absolute, and disorder is never
total. These terms represent segments along a continuum .... ").
89. T. BENDITT, supra note 73, at 34; A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 1-2 (1977); R.
POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 76-77 (1944); Buchanan, supra note 81, at 67; Dworkin, supra
note 77, at 100-01.
90. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (Holmes, J.) ("The most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre and
causing a panic.").
91. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v.
City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908).
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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the law to the facts incorrectly. Moreover, damages, criminal sanctions,
and injunctions are all imperfect tools for vindicating rights. Damages
cannot restore a severed limb, and imprisonment of a murderer cannot
bring the victim back to life. And, as anyone familiar with institutional
reform litigation knows, injunctive relief often entails substantial compli-
ance problems.93
The fact that rights cannot always be enforced does not diminish the
importance of the principle that rights should have remedies. Although
enforcement of rights may sometimes be difficult or controversial, courts
must strive to provide adequate remedies. Section II suggests a means of
accomplishing this goal.
II. Developing a New Approach to the Enforcement
of Legal Rights
Because rights serve critical purposes, the fabric of society is
threatened when rights are not adequately enforced. This section of the
Article suggests a new approach that would enable the federal courts to
enforce rights as fully and effectively as possible. It begins with a general
outline of the suggested approach, and then applies that approach to two
major impediments to the enforcement of rights in the federal courts: the
abstention doctrines, and the new restrictive standards for implication of
private rights of action under federal statutes. The section concludes
that the abstention doctrines must be abandoned or substantially re-
stricted, and that the federal courts should return to the traditional stan-
dards for implication of private rights of action. It also suggests steps
that Congress should take if the Supreme Court fails to make the neces-
sary changes.
93. See generally D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Zeigler,
Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doc-
trine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 31, 85-110 (1985); Special Project,
The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 792 (1978);
Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARv. L. REV. 428
(1977).
Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether the common-law system has the
capacity to vindicate individual rights in an urban industrial economy. Professors Stewart and
Sunstein, for example, suggest four reasons why modem economic conditions undermine com-
mon-law remedies. They argue that mass markets create disparities in information and bar-
gaining power, thus making common-law rules of exchange inadequate. In addition, complex
and collective harms such as pollution tax the common law's ability to define private entitle-
ments. Because many new harms affect a large number of people but the injury to each indi-
vidual is small, private damage actions often fail to deter lawbreakers. Finally, equality of
treatment is difficult to achieve through decentralized private litigation. Stewart & Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1235-36 (1982).
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To give proper weight to the principle that rights should have reme-
dies, federal courts must begin with a presumption in favor of enforce-
ment of legal rights.94 An allegation that a right has been violated should
constitute a prima facie case for enforcement if the plaintiff prevails on
the merits. The burden should then shift to the defendant to demon-
strate that the right should not be enforced. The more fundamental the
right, the heavier the burden on the defendant.
If the defendant asserts a recognized doctrine or important policy
that would deny the plaintiff's right, the court must then determine
whether the purposes underlying the doctrine or policy are of sufficient
importance to overcome the presumption of enforcement. In making this
determination, the federal court should assess the harm the plaintiff will
suffer if the litigation does not go forward. A court may consider the
availability of alternate means of enforcing the right, such as proceeding
in a state forum. But if alternate means might fail to vindicate the plain-
tiff's right fully and effectively, the case should go forward unless the
defendant can advance reasons that are sufficiently compelling to rebut
the presumption. To meet this burden, the defendant should have to
show that enforcement of the plaintiff's right would seriously harm
others or would substantially interfere with important governmental pol-
icies or programs. Moreover, the harm to others or to important govern-
mental interests must be greater than the harm to the plaintiff if his right
is not enforced.
This approach has several advantages over current practice. By cre-
ating a presumption favoring enforcement, it recognizes at the outset the
importance of the principle that rights must have remedies. It also re-
quires a court to consider the specific harm the plaintiff will suffer if his
right is not enforced in federal court. A doctrine or policy that would
deny enforcement cannot be considered in the abstract. It cannot be
applied simply because it has been used in the past or because it has
important general purposes. Instead, the defendant must affirmatively
demonstrate that the potential harm from enforcement in federal court is
sufficiently grave that enforcement would be unjust.
A. The Abstention Doctrines
Many technical requirements must be satisfied to state a claim cog-
nizable in federal court.95 Satisfaction of all of these requirements, how-
94. Several commentators have made this general suggestion. See, e.g., T. BENDITT,
supra note 73, at 34; Buchanan, supra note 81, at 67; Lyons, supra note 83, at 5-6; Vlastos,
Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 84, at 47.
95. The plaintiffmust allege violation of a right and at least nominal injury. He must also
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ever, does not ensure that a federal court will hear a case. In certain
circumstances the court may invoke an abstention doctrine to dismiss or
postpone the suit. Courts abstain most often in cases alleging violations
of federal constitutional rights,96 but they also abstain in diversity cases
seeking vindication of state-created rights.97 Abstention is invoked pri-
marily in cases seeking equitable relief, yet equity developed to ensure a
fuller, more effective vindication of rights. By denying enforcement of
established rights in injunctive actions, the abstention doctrines conflict
with the principle underlying the development of equity-that rights
should have remedies.98
The abstention doctrines are complex and interrelated. Little con-
sensus has been acheived on how they should be grouped or even on how
many different doctrines exist. 99 In Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States, °0 the Supreme Court identified three general
categories of abstention associated with well-known abstention cases:
Younger, 10' Pullman,10 2 and Thibodaux-Burford.10 3 These categories
will be used here.1°4
have standing. A plaintiff has standing to sue if he has a sufficient stake in the dispute and is
sufficiently adversarial to a defendant to raise an article III case or controversy. Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). In addition, the plaintiff must have a cause of action. As the
previous discussion makes clear, this condition is satisfied if either a statute or a court decision
authorizes him to seek judicial relief for violation of a right. The Supreme Court recently
suggested a further refinement of the concept by separating a cause of action from the relief
sought.
Thus it may be said that ... cause of action is a question of whether a particular
plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropri-
ately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a question of the various remedies a
federal court may make available.
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40 n. 18 (1979). As to subject matter and personal juris-
diction requirements, see Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 249 (1951); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
96. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.L 71, 71 (1984).
97. See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
98. State forums generally do not provide adequate remedies. See infra notes 114-24,
152-58, 192-93 & 206-15 and accompanying text.
99. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 303 (4th ed. 1983); Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071,
1147 (1974).
100. 424 U.S. 800, 814-17 (1976).
101. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
102. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
103. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
104. Colorado River created a limited fourth category of abstention used in cases involving
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(1) The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris
In Younger v. Harris the Supreme Court held that a federal court
may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding unless the moving
party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer great and immediate
irreparable harm if denied relief.10 5 Plaintiff Harris had been indicted
under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act for distributing political
leaflets. Although the Act was vulnerable to serious first amendment
challenge, 10 6 District Attorney Younger pursued the case. Harris moved
unsuccessfully in the California trial and appellate courts to have the case
dismissed, and then sought a federal injunction against further prosecu-
tion.107 A three-judge court granted the injunction, but the Supreme
Court reversed, citing concerns of equity, comity, and federalism.10 8 De-
spite Harris' ordeal and the merit of his case, he was required to present
his constitutional claims in his defense of the state prosecution. 10 9 The
Court observed that "the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to
defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be
parallel federal and state court proceedings. 424 U.S. at 817-21. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1983), reaffirmed that Colorado River
abstention is appropriate only in rare cases, and the lower federal courts generally have exer-
cised jurisdiction in post-Cone cases despite the pendency of parallel state proceedings. See 17
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4247, at 187
n.70 (Supp. 1986) for extensive citation to such cases. Consequently, this form of abstention
will not be addressed further. For discussion of Colorado River abstention, see generally M.
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 249-
55 (1980); C. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 315-19; C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra.
105. 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine predates the Younger
case. The Supreme Court first addressed the propriety of federal court intervention in state
criminal proceedings in In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 209-10, 219-20 (1888), and declined to
intervene. The Court has taken a flexible approach to this form of abstention over the years.
During some periods it has been read narrowly or ignored, while at other times it has been
asserted vigorously. See Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of
the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 266, 270 (1976). For reviews of the historical development of the doctrine, see
Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
740 (1974); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceed-
ings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1975);
Zeigler, supra, at 269-83.
106. In 1969, one year after the lower court decision in Younger, the Supreme Court held a
similar Ohio statute unconstitutional. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
Brandenburg gave short shrift to Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), which had up-
held the California law, stating "Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions."
395 U.S. at 447.
107. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 510 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
108. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41-45 (1971).
109. Id. at 45.
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considered 'irreparable' ... harm."' 10
The Supreme Court soon extended Younger to bar interference with
state-initiated civil proceedings."' Simultaneously, the Court expanded
Younger-to preclude cases seeking systemic reform of state practices and
procedures, even though the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin any pending
state court proceedings. 1" 2 The Court also made plain that the excep-
tions to the doctrine are to be very narrowly construed.' 3
110. Id. at 46. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), decided the same day as
Younger, the Court refused to permit federal declaratory relief that had "virtually the same
practical impact as a formal injunction." Id. at 72. In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971),
another companion case, the Court overturned a lower court decision ordering return of
materials illegally seized by state officials. The Perez Court reasoned that the federal suppres-
sion order would effectively terminate the state prosecution, and thus would have the same
effect as a direct injunction against the prosecution. Id. at 84-85.
111. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-35 (1979) (ordering the lower federal court not
to interfere with a pending state court proceeding in which the State of Texas had taken cus-
tody of the federal plaintiffs' children to protect them from alleged child abuse); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-47 (1977) (holding Younger applicable in a federal action by
welfare recipients challenging attachment of their assets by the State of Illinois without notice
or other procedural safeguards).
112. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (reversing lower court decision that
ordered Philadelphia police officials to submit a plan to establish new police department proce-
dures for receiving, investigating, and adjudicating civilian complaints against the police);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974) (ordering dismissal of complaint seeking
injunctive relief against systematic and continuing program of racial discrimination in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in Cairo, Illinois).
113. M. RtDISH, supra note 104, at 305. Virtually any theoretically available state remedy
will be deemed adequate, even if it is futile in practice. For example, in Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332 (1975), plaintiffs argued that resort to the California state courts was futile because
those courts had recently upheld the constitutionality of the obscenity statute involved in the
federal action. The Court responded: "But Younger v. Harris is not so easily avoided. State
courts, like other courts, sometimes change their minds." Id. at 350 n.18. In O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the Court suggested a variety of possible state remedies for plain-
tiffs' claim that local police, judges, and prosecutors were intentionally engaged in a systematic
and continuing program of racial discrimination in the administration of criminal justice. Id.
at 502. However, some of the remedies probably could be granted only by the judges who were
allegedly a part of the conspiracy, while others, such as federal criminal prosecutions, could
not be initiated by the plaintiffs. As Professor Owen Fiss has observed, the "adequacy of [the]
alternative remedies [in O'Shea] was evidently presumed from the fact that Justice White was
able to think of them." Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1154 (1977). Furthermore,
once a federal court dismisses a case on Younger grounds, plaintiffs do not have the opportu-
nity to return to federal court to demonstrate that the state remedies were unavailing. The
presumption of the adequacy of state remedies is irrebuttable. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the
Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987,
1030.
As noted above, Younger itself refused to consider the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
defending against a criminal prosecution to be irreparable injury. Younger did suggest that
bad faith on the part of state officials could be a special circumstance warranting federal inter-
vention, 401 U.S. at 49, but bad faith is difficult to prove. See, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 126 n.6 (1975) (rejecting plaintiff's bad faith claim and defining bad faith to mean "that a
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Younger abstention routinely results in the denial of fundamental
constitutional rights. With their federal suits dismissed, the plaintiffs are
relegated to the tender mercies of the state courts. There often are disad-
vantages to litigating federal constitutional claims in state rather than
federal court. State judges are not uniformly well qualified. 114 They may
lack expertise in federal law' 15 or be subject to majoritarian political
pressure.1 6 They also may be biased in reviewing actions of other state
officials. 117
Moreover, many constitutional claims cannot be effectively raised in
defending criminal or civil charges in individual cases. A person such as
the defendant in Younger who raises a constitutional challenge to the
statute under which he is charged must first present his claim to a busy
trial judge. A trial judge will be very reluctant to overturn a state statute
from his position in the state judicial hierarchy, and state law may dis-
courage interlocutory appeals in criminal cases. If a criminal defendant
fails to comply with state procedural requirements for preserving his con-
stitutional claim, the federal courts will not hear it.'18 If the defendant
chooses to plead guilty to a reduced charge, the claim is waived."19
Reform of unconstitutional state practices and procedures is virtu-
prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid convic-
tion"). See Fiss, supra, at 1115-16 n.36 for a brief discussion of the narrowness of the bad faith
exception. See generally Wingate, The Bad Faith-Harassment Exception to the Younger Doc-
trine: Exploring the Empty Universe, 5 REv. LITIGATION 123 (1986).
114. M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 63-65 (1979); M. LEVIN, URBAN
POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS 13-14 (1977); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1977).
115. M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 2; Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1356-57 (1970).
116. McMillan, Abstention-The Judiciary's Self-Inflicted Wound, 56 N.C.L. REv. 527,
544 (1978); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157,
158 (1953); Neuborne, supra note 114, at 1127-28.
117. Chevigny, supra note 115, at 1358; see also Comment, Protecting Fundamental Rights
in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 86
(1977).
118. The procedural default is considered an adequate and independent state ground bar-
ring both direct Supreme Court review and federal habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977) (applying this rule in a habeas corpus case); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91, 92-102 (1955) (applying the rule in direct review of a case); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S.
441, 443 (1935) (same).
119. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (A guilty plea waives
all prior nonjurisdictional defects "not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of
factual guilt."); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); Wallace v. Heinze,
351 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. Oliver, 384 U.S. 954 (1966); United
States ex rel. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915
(1966). But see Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) (When the state allows appellate
review of a constitutional issue after a guilty plea, the federal courts also will hear the issue.).
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ally impossible to achieve by defending charges in an individual case. 120
A court may dismiss the charges, but it generally cannot extend relief to
the class of people subjected to similar constitutional deprivations. 121
State law may provide other means of seeking systemic reform, for exam-
ple by civil suit or mandamus, but many states limit class actions, 22 and
in other states judicial hostility to the class device restricts its utility.123
In sum, while federal constitutional rights can sometimes be vindicated
in state courts, in many cases they cannot.124
Proponents of Younger abstention cite concerns of comity, federal-
ism, and equity in support of the doctrine. Traditional considerations of
comity suggest that a court should not attempt to wrest a case from an-
other judicial system that has assumed jurisdiction.12 5 Intervention in
pending state proceedings reflects negatively upon a state court's ability
to enforce constitutional rights.126 As the Younger Court stated, federal-
ism requires
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways. 127
120. See Zeigler, supra note 93, at 77-85.
121. Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Re-
lief 1977 Sup. Cr. REV. 193, 194, 199; Weissman, The Discriminatory Application of Penal
Laws by State Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers: Playing the Shell Game ofRights and Rem-
edies, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 489, 517 (1975).
122. See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609,
612-25 (1971).
123. See Zeigler, supra note 93, at 49 n.94.
124. In some instances defendants in criminal cases can seek eventual federal review of
their constitutional claims in the Supreme Court by way of federal habeas corpus. But the
Supreme Court can review only a few such cases each year, and federal habeas corpus has legal
and practical limitations. See Zeigler, supra note 93, at 79-83. See generally Zeigler & Her-
mann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47
N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1972).
125. See Chittenden v. Brewster, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 191 (1864); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 612, 624-25 (1849); Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836); M'kim v. Voorhies,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 279 (1812); Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807);
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitu-
tional Protections (pt. 1), 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1974); Warren, Federal and State Court Inter-
ference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 349 (1930). See generally Theis, Younger. v. Harris:
Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 113-18 (1981).
126. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 603 (1975). State courts, like federal courts; "have the solemn responsibility... 'to guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution.' " Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, Ill U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
127. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; see also Trainor v. Hemandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975).
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According to this view, the federal courts should respect a state's interest
"in not having its judicial process grind to a halt while the federal courts
decide constitutional questions."' 128 The equity strand of the Younger
rationale is based on the traditional maxim that a court of equity could
act only when the moving party was without an adequate remedy at law
and would suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. 129
Although these concerns are important, they hardly are sufficient to
overcome the presumption in favor of enforcement of fundamental con-
stitutional rights that is denied by Younger abstention.1 30 Comity is dis-
cretionary, not mandatory.13 1  It is largely a matter of courtesy and
politeness. A case alleging denial of fundamental rights should not be
dismissed out of hand simply because the relief sought might make a
state judge feel bad. 132
Vague ideas of federalism also are insufficient to rebut the prima
facie case for enforcement of legal rights. Arguments that rely on states'
rights as a basis for denying federal constitutional rights should always
be viewed with suspicion. The phrase "states' rights" has sometimes
been a mere code expression supporting a thinly veiled policy of repres-
sion. In the 1940s and 1950s, for example, segregationists asserted
"states' rights" to block federal integration efforts. 133 The state right as-
serted was in fact the "right" to continue to discriminate on the basis of
race.
128. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 463, 472 (1978).
129. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814-15 (1974); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Ancient
equitable principles also prevented courts of equity from interfering with criminal proceedings.
See Whitten, supra note 105, at 597-600. This principle was abrogated in the United States at
the turn of the century. See Zeigler, supra note 105, at 271-72.
130. Younger itself concerned the first amendment. Criminal prosecutions implicate a
host of important constitutional protections, including the fourth, sixth, and eighth amend-
ments' procedural guarantees, as well as due process and equal protection. See Zeigler, supra
note 93, at 40-41. In addition, incarceration takes away rights to move freely and to associate
with persons of one's own choice. Id. at 41.
131. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895). In the international sphere, comity is
extended by one nation to the judicial actions of another nation only with "due regard... to
the rights of its own citizens." Id. at 164.
132. Michael Wells is strongly critical of the Supreme Court's use of comity when balanc-
ing a state's interest in adjudicating cases in state court with an individual's interest in a federal
forum. See Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REv. 59 (1981).
He concludes that "the Court, desiring to accommodate both interests, makes arbitrary dis-
tinctions because it cannot find good ones. It employs comity as a vague abstraction in order
to avoid having to choose between these interests as a general guide to decision making." Id.
at 60.
133. See generally ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [V/ol. 38
The United States adopted a federal governmental structure to en-
hance freedom and to ensure that no level of government became tyran-
nous. 34 Consequently, it is inappropriate, and even ironic, to argue that
federalism concerns should lead to the denial of rights. Instead, federal-
ism issues generally should be resolved in a way that fosters the vindica-
tion of rights. Federalism concerns clearly do not justify blind deference
to state courts when those courts deny federal constitutional rights.
Equity concerns likewise do not support Younger abstention. Eq-
uity developed to enforce rights, not to deny them. Equity is flexible;
Younger abstention is rigid. Principles of equity support, dismissal of a
case if the requirements for equitable relief are not satisfied, but they do
not support automatic dismissal of a case with no consideration of the
plaintiff's claims. 135 Moreover, equitable principles require a court to
deny injunctive relief only when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law. As demonstrated above, however, alternate state court remedies
often are inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights. 136 Therefore, an au-
tomatic dismissal that creates an irrebuttable presumption of adequacy 137
hardly accords with traditional equitable principles.
None of the reasons offered in support of Younger abstention are
sufficient to overcome the presumption of enforcement of rights.
Younger abstention therefore should be abandoned. 138
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 244-46 (J. Madison), No. 51, at 323- 25 (J. Madison),
No. 85, at 521 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Stone, The Common Law in the
United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 21-22 (1936).
135. See Redish, supra note 96, at 86. As Professors Soifer and Macgill state:
The considerations of equity and comity developed through decades by the Court to
accommodate the tensions among state power, federal power, and individual rights,
have been turned into a single, rigid commandment of federal judicial inaction that
violates even such rules as equity and comity could be said to have contained. As the
Court declared recently, "where a case is properly within [the scope of the Younger
doctrine], there is no discretion to grant injunctive relief." [quoting Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n. 22 (1976)]. This
rigidity has eliminated the discretionary balancing at the heart of equity.
Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. Rv.
1141, 1143 (1977) (footnote omitted) (brackets in original).
136. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 113.
138. This is not a new suggestion, although the argument advanced here is almost cer-
tainly more direct and fundamental than other arguments for the doctrine's abandonment.
Commentators have advocated abandoning Younger on a wide variety of grounds. See, eg.,
Redish, supra note 96 (contending that abstention doctrines ignore the dictates of valid juris-
dictional and civil rights statutes and thus usurp legislative authority in violation of separation
of powers principles); Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 382, 405-19 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court has obscured and denigrated the
meaning of federal equity doctrine and overstepped its authority to refuse injunctions); Soifer
& Macgill, supra note 135, at 1143-44, 1185-88 (contending that the Younger doctrine has
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(2) The Pullman Doctrine
Pullman abstention originated in Railroad Commission v. Pull-
man. 139 In Texas, on trains with only one sleeping car, the car was in the
charge of a porter rather than a conductor. Porters were black; conduc-
tors were white. The Texas Railroad Commission ordered that all sleep-
ing cars be in the charge of a conductor. The Pullman Company and the
affected railroads brought suit in federal court contending that the order
violated state law and the equal protection, due process, and commerce
clauses of the United States Constitution. The porters intervened and
raised similar objections. A three-judge district court enjoined enforce-
ment of the order, but the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to
abstain. 140
The Court noted that the Texas statute establishing the authority of
the Railroad Commission imposed a duty on the Commission "to correct
abuses and prevent unjust discrimination in the rates ... of such rail-
roads.., and to prevent any and all other abuses in the conduct of their
business."'1 41 The Court thought that the Commission's order might vio-
late this provision, thus entitling the plaintiffs to relief under state law
and avoiding the need to determine the federal constitutional ques-
tions.1 42 It was unclear, however, whether the general language of the
statute should be construed to invalidate the Commission's order. Be-
cause the final word on the meaning of the state statute could be supplied
only by the Supreme Court of Texas, the district court was ordered to
retain jurisdiction of the case while the plaintiffs sought a determination
of the state-law issue in the state courts.143
Pullman thus established three criteria for abstention. The case
must present both state-law and federal constitutional issues, state law on
eliminated the discretionary balancing at the heart of equity and has distorted federalism and
comity principles by requiring the federal courts always to give way); Weissman, supra note
121, at 492-94, 515-16 (asserting that federal injunctive relief must be available to curb racial
discrimination in the application and enforcement of state penal laws by judicial and executive
officers because administrative controls and the power of the ballot are inadequate); Zeigler,
supra note 93 (contending that abstention in cases seeking reform of state criminal justice
systems is inconsistent with federal court activism in other areas, and that state judges are not
entitled to greater deference by federal courts than other state officials); Zeigler, supra note 113
(contending that the federal courts' refusal to use their equitable powers to reform state crimi-
nal justice systems directly contravenes the intent of the Reconstruction Congresses that
adopted the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
139. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
140. Id. at 497-98.
141. Id. at 499 n.1.
142. Id. at 501.
143. Id. at 501-02.
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the state issue must be unclear, and it must be possible that resolution of
the state-law issue will obviate the need to reach the federal constitu-
tional question. 144 The Pullman doctrine also allows the plaintiff to re-
turn to federal court for a ruling on the federal constitutional issue if the
state ruling on the state issue is unfavorable.' 45 The Supreme Court or-
dered Pullman abstention frequently during the 1940s and 1950s. 146 The
doctrine fell from favor during the 1960s,147 but was vigorously reas-
serted by the Burger Court. 4
In theory, Pullman abstention is very different from Younger ab-
stention. Under Pullman a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion only in limited circumstances, while under Younger a federal court
may exercise jurisdiction only in special circumstances. 49 Furthermore,
under Pullman the federal court retains jurisdiction pending resolution
in the state court, while under Younger the case is dismissed. Thus, Pull-
man abstention in theory merely postpones federal court consideration of
a constitutional issue, while Younger abstention requires the federal con-
stitutional issue to be adjudicated in the state courts. 150 Indeed, the pur-
pose of Pullman abstention is unobjectionable. It contemplates that state
courts will decide the state issues and that federal courts will decide the
federal constitutional issues if necessary, thus obtaining the most correct
possible resolution of all issues in the case. 15'
In practice, however, Pullman abstention often causes the same de-
144. Later cases modified the third criterion to permit abstention if resolution of the state-
law issue would at least materially change the nature of the problem. See, e.g., Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
145. To preserve this right, the plaintiff must present the federal constitutional claim to
the state court along with the state claim, but inform the court that he is reserving the federal
claim for later federal adjudication if necessary. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964).
146. See, e.g., Government & Civil Employees Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 347 U.S. 901
(1954); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946);
Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). See Wright, The Abstention Doc-
trine Reconsidered, 37 TEx. L. REv. 815, 817 n.9 (1959), for extensive citation of cases order-
ing abstention during these years.
147. See, eg., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (refusing Pullman abstention);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (same); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (same);
McNeese v. Board of Educ,, 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (same).
148. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (ordering
Pullman abstention); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (same); Boehning v. Indiana State
Employees Ass'n, 423 U.S. 6 (1975) (same); Lake Carriers'-Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498
(1972) (same). For extensive citation of such cases, see 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 104, § 4241, at 443-45 n.53
(1978).
149. See supra notes 105 & 111-13 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 113.
151. Field, supra note 99, at 1085. Since Pullman merely delays consideration of the fed-
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nial of constitutional rights as Younger abstention. Consider the burden
placed on the federal plaintiff when the district court invokes Pullman
abstention. He must now begin a separate state court action seeking res-
olution of the unclear state issue. Unless the plaintiff achieves a quick
victory at the trial level and his opponent chooses not to appeal, resolu-
tion of the state-law issue may involve years of litigation through the
various levels of the state courts. 152 Moreover, a definitive interpretation
of state law cannot be achieved if the highest state court refuses to grant
review. If the plaintiff loses on the state-law issue in the lower state
courts and the state high court denies review, abstention is a waste of
time. 5 3 Although the lower state court decisions may provide some gui-
dance on the meaning of state law, the federal court is necessarily forced
to make a tentative decision of that issue in deciding the federal constitu-
tional question.
Pullman abstention thus entails both financial costs and substantial
delays in the vindication of both the state and the federal rights at issue,
with no assurance of either a definitive state court ruling on state issues
or the avoidance of the need for a federal court to reach the constitu-
tional questions. 54 Faced with these facts, the plaintiff may feel com-
pelled to give up the right to return to the federal forum and instead
litigate both the state and federal claims at the state level.155 Or the
plaintiff may give up completely in frustration. The costs and uncer-
tainty can be reduced substantially if state law allows a federal court to
eral claim, it may be said not to violate separation of powers principles, assuming that the
delay is not great. Redish, supra note 96, at 90.
152. Given the enormous delays in civil cases in many state courts, even a simple state
declaratory judgment action may take a very long time. See Field, supra note 99, at 1144-45
n.20. If the plaintiff loses at the trial level, he must appeal in an attempt to obtain a definitive
ruling by the highest state court. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1006 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
153. Pullman abstention is ordered not so much because state court judges are innately
better able to resolve local issues, but rather because a state supreme court interpretation of
state law is by definition the correct interpretation. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 590, 604 (1977).
154. Id. at 604-05. Commentators have chronicled delays of many years in Pullman cases.
See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 235; Field, supra note 99, at 1085 n.61; Shapiro,
Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction: Two Chips Off the Same Block?-A Comparative Analy-
sis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75, 78 n.16 (1975). The Supreme Court has recognized this problem.
See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 628 (1974);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
155. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133,
1251 (1977); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist
Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604, 605 (1967).
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certify an issue directly to the highest state court for decision. 156 But
even the certification process can entail substantial delay,1 57 and some
states impose restrictions that limit its utility.158
Pullman abstention is said to serve four important purposes. First, it
furthers the policy that courts should avoid constitutional issues when a
case can be disposed of on other grounds. 159 Second, it guards the inde-
pendence of state governments by avoiding intrusive or disruptive con-
structions of state law 60 or other interference with important state
interests by federal courts.' 6' Third, Pullman abstention avoids the dan-
ger that a federal constitutional decision will be undermined or displaced
by a different state court interpretation of state law. 162 Finally, absten-
tion helps ease federal court congestion. 63
Of these four purposes, only the second may properly overcome the
presumption of the enforcement of legal rights. The first purpose, the
desire to avoid constitutional decisions, is only a policy, not an ironclad
command. 164 The Supreme Court recently recognized the limits of this
policy in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman. 165 The Pen-
nhurst Court held that the eleventh amendment bars a federal court from
adjudicating claims that state officials violated state law in carrying out
156. Approximately two-thirds of the states have adopted some form of certification pro-
cedure. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 104, § 4248, at 525 n.29
(1978 & 1986 Supp. at 199). See generally The Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis of State
Laws Providing for Certification by Federal Courts of Determinative State Issues of Law, 42
REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 101 (1987).
157. For example, after the Supreme Court ordered abstention in 1976 in Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976), the district court certified several questions to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court for resolution. The state court answered the questions, the district
court again held the statute unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979). Three years elapsed, however, between the decision to abstain
and the final judgment in the case. See Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266,
274-75 (5th Cir. 1976) (recognizing the significant delays in certification and the possible in-
ability to frame the issue so as to produce a helpful response on the part of the state court); see
also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 293-94 (1969).
158. See, e.g., Holden v. NL Indus., 629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981) (holding that certification
rule violated a state constitutional provision); In re Certified Question, 549 P.2d 1310 (Wyo.
1976) (holding that the Wyoming Supreme Court will not answer a certified question unless
nothing is left for the federal court to do but apply the answer to the question and enter
judgment).
159. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312
U.S. 496, 498, 501 (1941); C. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 305; Redish, supra note 96, at 95.
160. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01; M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 234.
161. M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 234; Field, supra note 99, at 1095.
162. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01; M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 234.
163. C. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 303.
164. Field, supra note 99, at 1097.
165. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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their official duties. 166 The plaintiffs argued that such a rule would cause
a federal court to reach federal constitutional issues in cases that might
properly be disposed of by granting relief on a pendent state claim. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, referring to avoidance of consti-
tutional decisions as a policy consideration. 167 Thus, Pennhurst estab-
lishes that a federal court cannot avoid reaching constitutional issues if it
is unable to resolve a case on state law grounds. Similarly, a federal
court should not invoke Pullman absention if practical considerations
preclude a plaintiff from obtaining a prompt and definitive determination
of state law issues in the state courts. In such cases, the policy of avoid-
ing constitutional decisions must yield so that the controversy can be
heard promptly and resolved.
The second Pullman justification seeks to promote two different
sorts of state independence interests. The first is simply a state's desire
to construe its own laws. 168 Federal court decision of state-law issues can
cause friction, particularly if the decision misconstrues state law. This
interest is akin to the comity concerns cited in support of Younger ab-
stention. 69 It is a very amorphous consideration, and hardly a persua-
sive justification for refusing to enforce constitutional rights. The
constitutional and statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction demonstrate
the relative unimportance of this interest. Federal judges routinely con-
strue state law in diversity cases.1 70 Diversity jurisdiction exists because
of fear that out-of-state litigants will be unfairly deprived of their rights
under state law. 171 It follows a fortiori that fear of denial of federal con-
stitutional rights in federal question cases is sufficient to overcome the
state interest in unimpeded interpretation of state law.
The second interest is the state's desire to avoid federal interference
with substantive state policies or programs. A serious and wrongful in-
terference of this sort may occur in at least two circumstances: (1) if a
federal court orders relief on a state-law claim based on an erroneous
interpretation of state law and does not reach the federal constitutional
issue; (2) if a federal court upholds the constitutionality of state action
166. Id. at 106.
167. Id. at 123 ("In any case, the answer to [plaintiffs'] assertion is that such considerations
of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary
to adjudicate suits against a State.") (emphasis added). Pennhurst has other interesting impli-
cations for Pullman abstention. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
168. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01.
169. See supra notes 125 & 131-32 and accompanying text.
170. One of the criticisms of diversity jurisdiction, however, is that it forces federal judges
to determine difficult issues of state law. C. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 132.
171. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67 (1809).
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based on an erroneous interpretation of state law. An example illustrates
how these harms can occur. Assume that a bank owning land in an arid
California county brings a federal suit to prevent the County Water Dis-
trict from carrying out a new water-allocation system that reduces the
bank's allocation and gives priority to single families. Assume further
that the bank alleges violation of both state land use and water law and
the fourteenth amendment, and that state law on the state-law issues is
unclear. 172
If the federal court hears the case, it has two options in deciding the
state-law claims: it can find the allocation system invalid under state law
or it can find that state law authorizes the plan. If the court correctly
finds the system invalid under state law, the court has vindicated state
interests. Single families may go thirsty, but this result presumably ac-
cords with broader state policies and goals. If the court wrongly invali-
dates the plan, however, it may impair state interests by allowing a
commercial user to obtain water at the expense of families. In addition,
the mistake will be hard to correct. It may be some time before the same
issue reaches the California Supreme Court in another case, and by then
the harm will be done. The state legislature may enact legislation declar-
ing such plans valid, thus giving families additional water, but such ac-
tion may also come too late to avoid the harm.
Pennhurst should reduce the likelihood of this sort of harm because
it forbids a federal court from granting relief against state officials for
violation of state law. 173 Thus, if state rather than county officials had
promulgated the new water-allocation plan, the federal court would be
precluded from ruling on its validity under state law. Pennhurst, how-
ever, does not preclude federal relief against county or local officials be-
cause the eleventh amendment does not apply to counties or other state
subdivisions. 174 Consequently, the sort of harm described in the hypo-
thetical may still occur. 175
172. The facts of the example are drawn from Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1985). The court conducted a
straightforward Pullman analysis and approved the lower court's decision to abstain.
173. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106.
174. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
175. It is difficult to predict whether Pennhurst will result in more or less Pullman absten-
tion in cases brought against state officials. Before Pennhurst, a federal court contemplating
Pullman abstention might abstain, decide the case on state grounds, or decide the case on
federal constitutional grounds. After Pennhurst, the court has only two options. It can abstain
or reach the constitutional issue. Since a court can no longer hear the case while avoiding the
constitutional issue, it may be more likely to find the Pullman criteria met and send the plain-
tiff to state court, particularly if the plaintiff's state-law claim appears strong. On the other
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The court's other option in deciding the state-law issue is to hold the
water-allocation plan valid under state law. If it makes this decision, it
must reach the federal constitutional questions. If the finding of validity
is correct under state law, decision of the federal constitutional issues will
not improperly interfere with state water allocation. If the court finds
the allocation system constitutional, the decision will vindicate the state's
interest in providing more water for families. If the court finds the allo-
cation system unconstitutional, that state interest properly must give
way. If the court has wrongly found the plan valid under state law,
however, decision of the federal constitutional issues may improperly in-
terfere with state interests. If the federal court finds the allocation sys-
tem unconstitutional, no harm to state interests occurs because the plan
is invalid under state law. If the federal court finds the allocation plan
constitutional, however, its judgment will affirm a plan that should have
been found invalid under state law. Thus, the federal court may harm
state interests by wrongly denying sufficient water for commercial devel-
opment. And the incorrect decision that the plan is valid as a matter of
state law will be as difficult to correct as an incorrect decision that the
plan is invalid. 176
An incorrect reading of state law by a federal court thus may result
in serious harm to important state policies or programs. As the example
makes clear, however, such harm is not inevitable. Nonetheless, the pos-
sibility of such harm must be carefully assessed by a district judge and is
an important concern supporting Pullman abstention.
The third purpose of Pullman abstention is to avoid the danger that
a federal court's decision will be undermined or displaced by a different
interpretation of state law by the state's courts. This purpose is insuffi-
cient to overcome the presumption favoring enforcement of rights. Some
federal judicial resources may be wasted if a federal ruling is mooted, but
hand, a court may apply the Pullman criteria no differently, and decide the constitutional issue
when the criteria are not met.
176. The same sorts of interference with state interests were possible in Pullman itself,
although the state interest at stake was hardly a compelling one. The federal court might have
wrongly interpreted the state statute defining the Railroad Commission's power to void the
order placing all sleepers in the charge of white conductors. If the court had granted relief on
this basis, it would have interfered only with the state's interest in practicing racial discrimina-
tion. Not surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter did not choose to identify the state interest pro-
tected by Pullman in quite this way. Instead, he said the case "touches a sensitive area of
social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its
adjudication is open." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. On the other hand, a more compelling harm
to state interests would have occurred in Pullman if the federal court had upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Commission's order after mistakenly concluding that the authorizing statute
did not void the order. Such a result would have allowed the Commission to enforce its order
barring black porters from attending sleeping cars.
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a decision to abstain and the possible appeal of that decision may take as
much or more time and effort as a decision on the merits. 177 Again, if it
is worth risking displacement of a federal decision in diversity cases, it
seems worth risking displacement to enforce federal constitutional
rights. 178
In cases in which a misconstruction of state law leads to improper
interference with important state policies, displacement of the federal
ruling by a state decision that corrects the error would presumably be
welcomed by the federal court. When an incorrect interpretation of state
law does not result in serious interference with state policies, it is hard to
see any great harm to either state or federal interests if the federal deci-
sion is subsequently displaced. In the water-allocation case, for example,
if the federal court erroneously found the new county water plan valid
under state law but went on to hold it unconstitutional, the federal deci-
sion would be undermined if the state supreme court later found such
plans to be invalid under state law. But the federal court would have
arrived at the correct result, even though the federal constitutional deci-
sion could have been avoided.
The final reason advanced in support of Pullman abstention is the
need to ease federal court congestion. This justification can hardly over-
come the presumption favoring enforcement of rights. Even if some re-
strictions on federal jurisdiction prove necessary, actions seeking
vindication of constitutional rights are the least appropriate cases to ex-
clude. And, as noted above, Pullman abstention often does not save fed-
eral court resources.
Ultimately, it is a very close case whether Pullman abstention
should be retained. The only compelling argument supporting this form
of abstention is that in some cases an erroneous federal court interpeta-
tion of state law may interfere with important state interests. Thus, if
Pullman abstention is retained, it should be invoked only when federal
court error is substantially likely to harm state interests. Moreover, the
strong presumption in favor of enforcement of constitutional rights re-
quires a substantial likelihood that the federal court will misinterpret
state law. The state issues must be genuinely novel and ambiguous, and
177. A Pullman abstention determination can be extremely complex, as the discussion of
the water-allocation hypothetical showed. A decision to abstain under Pullman is appealable.
See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1985); Pietzsch v. Mattox, 719 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1983).
178. The federal decision being displaced in a diversity case concerns state law; in a federal
question case the displaced federal decision concerns federal law. In either case, however, the
harm to federal interests seems to result mainly from the waste of judicial resources.
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state precedents or legislative records must be insufficient for the federal
court to make a reasoned interpretation of state law.
Delay in hearing constitutional claims can be justified only if it is
substantially likely, both analytically and practically, that decision of the
state-law issues will dispose of the case. Otherwise, the possible harm to
the state from misconstruction of its law cannot outweigh the harm the
plaintiff will suffer from nonenforcement of his rights. Analytically,
there must be a good chance that the state-law issue will be determined in
the plaintiff's favor by the state courts. Practically, there must be a sub-
stantial likelihood that the state courts will render a dispositive decision
promptly. In addition, abstention probably should not be ordered unless
a state has a procedure for certifying unclear issues of state law to the
highest state court. 179 An original action in state court is simply too
cumbersome because of its inherent delay and the uncertainty that a de-
finitive ruling can be obtained. If a state wants a federal court to be
solicitous of its interests, the state should be solicitous of federal interests
as well. If a state is unwilling to facilitate decisions of state issues, then
the federal court should decide them itself to ensure vindication of fed-
eral constitutional rights.
In addition, a federal court should not certify issues to the highest
state court unless the process is likely to produce a prompt decision. If
the state court has been slow to respond to certification requests in the
past, the federal court should hesitate to abstain. And if the wait for a
state court ruling becomes long enough to jeopardize a plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights, the federal court should impose a deadline after which it
will decide the case itself.18 0
(3) Thibodaux-Burford Abstention
a. Thibodaux Abstention
Thibodaux abstention originated in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
179. Field, supra note 153, at 592; see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
180. The federal court should consider granting interim relief to protect the plaintiff's
rights while awaiting answers to the certified questions if it can do so without causing serious
harm to state interests. See, e.g., Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm'n, 535 F.2d
669, 672 (1st Cir. 1976) ("[C]onsiderations of equity and fairness . . . strongly suggest the
propriety of granting preliminary injunctive relief during the period that the district court,
retaining jurisdiction, awaits the state outcome."); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 312 n.18 (1979). In the water-allocation hypothetical, for example,
the court might have directed the county to give the bank the water due to it under the old
allocation system while awaiting a state determination of the validity of the new plan. If the
state supreme court decided the issue quickly, dangerous depletion of the county water supply
would be unlikely to occur.
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City of Thibodaux.'18 The city began a condemnation proceeding
against the power company in state court. The parties were diverse, and
the company removed the case to federal court. A state statute appeared
to authorize the city's action, but it had not been construed by the state
courts. An opinion by the state attorney general in a similar case sug-
gested that the statute did not authorize the taking.18 2 The district court
stayed the action so that the parties could seek an interpretation of the
statute by the state supreme court, and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed.18 3 The Court cited Pullman for the policy that a federal court
should obtain a definitive ruling on state law rather than risk a tentative
forecast.18 4 The Court also stressed as part of its abstention rationale
that eminent domain is "intimately involved with sovereign prerogative
... [and] concerns the apportionment of governmental powers between
City and State."' 185
Although the Thibodaux decision on its face is fairly straightfor-
ward, the contours of Thibodaux abstention are unclear. Thibodaux con-
flicts with other decisions holding that federal courts must hear diversity
cases even though they involve difficult or uncertain issues of state
law.' 86 The Thibodaux Court also did not address whether other state
interests might be sufficiently important to warrant abstention in diver-
sity cases. In addition, another case decided the same day confused mat-
ters by undercutting the eminent domain rationale. 8 7 Subsequent
181. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
182. Id. at 30.
183. Id. at 26, 30-31.
184. Id. at 27.
185. Id. at 28.
186. See, e.g., Meredith v. Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943) ("Congress having
adopted the policy of opening the federal courts to suitors in all diversity cases involving the
jurisdictional amount, we can discern in its action no recognition of a policy which would
exclude cases from the jurisdiction merely because they involve state law or because the law is
uncertain or difficult to determine."); see also Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-90 (1949);
Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946). But see Pennsylvania v. Wil-
liams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935) (ordering abstention in diversity cases); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S.
2 (1933) (same).
187. In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), the Court de-
clined to permit abstention in a case raising state eminent domain issues. Allegheny County
condemned land owned by Mashuda for the purpose of enlarging an airport but subsequently
leased the land to another company for private business use. Mashuda then began a federal
diversity action seeking return of its property alleging that the county had violated established
Pennsylvania law forbidding the use of eminent domain powers to condemn land for private
use. Id. at 187-88. The district court abstained, but the court of appeals reversed and the
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. Id. at 188, 198. While Thibodaux appeared to stress the
important state interest in unimpeded exercise of eminent domain powers, the Mashuda Court
stated:
[T]he fact that a case concerns a State's power of eminent domain no more justifies
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Supreme Court decisions have not clarified the scope of the doctrine,1 88
and lower court decisions are inconsistent. 189
Thibodaux abstention is very similar to Pullman abstention. In both
instances federal courts abstain when state law is unclear; the federal
court retains jurisdiction while the parties seek a definitive ruling on the
state-law issues in state court. Both doctrines seek to avoid erroneous
interpretations of state law that might improperly interfere with impor-
tant state policies, and both contemplate additional federal court action
to resolve the dispute if necessary. 190  The doctrines are not identical,
abstention than the fact that it involves any other issue related to sovereignty. Surely
eminent domain is no more mystically involved with "sovereign prerogative" than
... a host of other governmental activities carried on by the States and their subdivi-
sions ....
Id. at 191-92. Although the opinions are difficult to reconcile, the different outcomes can be
harmonized on the grounds suggested by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in
Thibodaux. He noted that while the Thibodaux district court only stayed the federal case, the
Mashuda district court ordered dismissal. In addition, while state law was unclear in
Thibodaux, state law was clear in Mashuda, and only factual issues needed resolution. See
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring).
188. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
814 (1976) (citing Thibodaux as a case presenting "difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the
case then at bar"); Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1975) (stating
the Court's inclination to apply Thibodaux abstention "when the state-law questions have con-
cerned matters peculiarly within the province of the local courts"). In Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968), the Court abstained in a diversity case involving the
state's power to condemn private land to secure water for a private business. The Court rea-
soned that the state courts should resolve the "truly novel" state-law issue that was of "vital
concern" in arid New Mexico. Id. at 594.
189. Some lower court decisions construe the doctrine narrowly. See, e.g., Miller-Davis
Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
abstention is appropriate in a diversity case only when the state issues are unclear and com-
plex, and when an incorrect resolution would threaten an important state policy); Thompson
v. Board of Educ. of Romeo Community Schools, 519 F. Supp. 1373, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1981)
("[T]o hold that a federal court should generally abstain from considering state law issues
because that precise issue has not yet been decided by the highest possible state court would do
serious damage to considerations in federal forums of state claims through pendent jurisdiction
and diversity jurisdiction. There must be some additional compelling circumstances presented
to the court before it should defer such state law questions."), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d
1200 (6th Cir. 1983). Other lower court decisions have ordered abstention in diversity cases
simply because state law was unclear, even though no official state action or regulatory policy
was involved. See, e.g., United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.) (en
bane) (court ordered abstention because state law was unclear as to whether a pilot was a
"passenger" within the meaning of an insurance policy), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964);
Richey v. Sumoge, 257 F. Supp. 32 (D. Or. 1966) (federal diversity proceeding stayed so de-
fendant could apply to Oregon court for a determination of validity of service of process under
Oregon declaratory judgment act).
190. Litigants in Pullman abstention cases can return to federal court if the state decision
on the state issues does not resolve the dispute. In Thibodaux, the Supreme Court explicitly
assumed that the district court order only postponed federal resolution of the case.
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however, because Pullman cases involve an underlying federal constitu-
tional issue while Thibodaux cases do not. 191 Thibodaux abstention thus
does not have as a purpose avoiding constitutional questions.
It might be argued that Thibodaux abstention is less objectionable
than Pullman abstention because Pullman threatens to obstruct the vin-
dication of fundamental constitutional rights while Thibodaux interferes
only with the enforcement of state-created rights that are better pursued
in a state forum. But the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction
entitles diverse litigants to a federal forum for vindication of state rights.
Moreover, state-created legal rights are important rights and should en-
joy a presumption favoring their full and prompt enforcement. Any doc-
trine that delays enforcement should be viewed with suspicion and
invoked only for very important reasons.
As with Pullman abstention, Thibodaux abstention would be unob-
jectionable if it worked in practice as intended in theory. 192 If a federal
court could obtain a prompt, definitive ruling on the state issue, absten-
tion would not interfere with the plaintiff's right to a federal forum and
would help ensure that the federal judgment was correct and final. But
Thibodaux abstention entails financial cost and substantial delay in the
vindication of rights, with no assurance that the highest state court will
either hear the case or resolve the state issues.
193  I
Given the presumption favoring enforcement of rights, Thibodaux
abstention should be retained only if substantial restrictions are placed
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29 ("Eventually the District Court will award compensation if the
taking is sustained.").
191. Pullman cases invoke federal question jurisdiction, while Thibodaux cases proceed
under diversity jurisdiction. As noted above, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984), reinforced the policies underlying Pullman abstention by forbidding a
federal court in a federal question case from granting relief against state officials for violation
of state law. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. Prior to Pennhurst, federal courts
could grant such relief through the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. The Pennhurst Court held
that this practice violated the eleventh amendment. 465 U.S. at 106. Pennhurst will not work
any change in diversity cases, however. The fiction of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
allowing unconstitutional state action by state officials to be considered the individual actions
of state officers for eleventh amendment purposes, has not been applied in diversity cases. See
Eure v. NVF Co., 481 F. Supp. 639, 641-42 (E.D.N.C. 1979); National Market Reports v.
Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 n.7 (S.D.W.Va. 1978). Consequently, diversity actions
against state officials for acts undertaken in their official capacity have long been considered
barred by the eleventh amendment. See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944);
O'Neill v. Early, 208 F.2d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1953).
192. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
193. The decision on the merits by the Fifth Circuit in the Thibodaux litigation came eight
years after the Supreme Court ordered abstention. See Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1967).
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on its use.194 As with Pullman abstention, state law must be genuinely
ambiguous. There must be a strong chance that the federal court will
misconstrue state law and that the erroneous construction will seriously
jeopardize important state interests. 195 Finally, Thibodaux abstention
should be considered only if a state has a certification process, 196 and the
federal court should monitor the process and decide the case itself if un-
reasonable delay develops.
b. Burford Abstention
Burford abstention, sometimes called administrative abstention, 197
originated in Burford v. Sun Oil Company. 198 Sun Oil brought a federal
suit against Burford and the Texas Railroad Commission to enjoin exe-
cution of a Commission order granting Burford the right to drill four
wells on a small plot of land in a Texas oil field. Sun Oil claimed that the
order violated state law and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Jurisdiction was asserted on both diversity and federal
question grounds. 199 The district court dismissed the case, but the court
of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, held that
the district court had properly abstained.2°°
The majority stressed several special and unusual factors supporting
abstention in the case. All drilling operations were interrelated, so that
an erroneous federal court decision in one case could adversely affect the
entire oil field.20 1 In addition, Texas had concentrated judicial review of
194. Some commentators have suggested that this form of abstention be abolished. See,
e.g., Redish, supra note 96, at 98 (arguing that separation of powers principles and the
problems of applying Thibodaux's "broad and nebulous criteria" dictate abandonment of the
doctrine unless Congress authorizes it).
195. Such potential harm arguably was present in Thibodaux If the federal court had
erroneously decided that state law did not authorize condemnation, the city would have been
wrongly denied the use of the land for public purposes.
196. The Supreme Court indicated its approval of certification in diversity cases in Leh-
man Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (Certification "does, of course, in the long run
save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. Its use in a
given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.") (footnote omitted).
197. See, e.g., Field, supra note 99, at 1153-55.
198. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
199. Id. at 316-17.
200. Id. at 334.
201. It is important to understand why federal court review of a Commission order affect-
ing a single well operator could have such serious consequences, because the dangers imply
some strict limits on the scope of Burford abstention. The oil field covered a large area, and
over 900 operators drew oil from it. Id. at 318-19. Texas regulatory policy sought to ensure
that each landowner withdrew only the oil under his surface area. Id. at 322. Careful supervi-
sion was necessary to achieve this goal because individual operators could obtain more than
their fair share by drawing oil from other parts of the field. In addition, too many wells and
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all Commission orders in the state district courts of one county to avoid
having different courts of equal dignity reach conflicting conclusions con-
cerning the same rules.20 2 The majority reasoned that federal court in-
tervention would almost certainly result in the conflicting interpretations
of state law that the state sought to avoid.20 3 Concentration of judicial
review also enabled the state judges to develop expertise on the complex
issues involved.20 4 Finally, the Court judged the Texas review proce-
dures to be "expeditious and adequate," 20 5 thus reducing the risk of
harm to the plaintiff from abstention.
Burford abstention is similar to Thibodaux abstention in that both
seek to avoid interference with important state policies and programs. 20 6
There are significant differences in the doctrines, however. In Thibodaux
the federal court abstained so that the plaintiff could seek state court
clarification of an uncertain issue of state law.20 7 In Burford the court
abstained because of the complexity of the state regulatory program and
to avoid inconsistent rulings from different forums.20 8 Thibodaux was a
diversity case involving no federal issues, while Burford involved both
state and federal claims. In Thibodaux the district court retained juris-
diction so that the parties could return for final resolution of the case,
while in Burford the Supreme Court ordered dismissal. 20 9 Thus, Burford
does not merely postpone federal resolution of the case, but instead re-
quires the plaintiff to litigate both his state and federal claims in a state
forum.210 In some ways, Burford abstention resembles Younger absten-
tion more than Thibodaux abstention. Both Burford and Younger rely
on the disruptive effect of federal court intervention per se to justify ab-
stention, and both deny the plaintiff a federal forum for resolution of his
federal claims.21'
careless drilling practices dissipated the natural gas that forced the oil to the surface. If gas
pressure was insufficient, expensive pumping procedures were required to extract the oil, and
some portion of it was lost. Id. at 319. Consequently, an order allowing one landowner to drill
new wells automatically affected the entire oil field. Id. at 324.
202. Id, at 326-27.
203. Id. at 327, 334.
204. Id. at 327.
205. Id. at 334.
206. M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 246.
207. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
208. The dissent argued that the applicable rules were relatively clear, thus making absten-
tion inappropriate. Burford, 319 U.S. at 339-42 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 334.
210. Field, supra note 99, at 1153.
211. There are also significant differences between Burford and Younger abstention. Bur-
ford is invoked in diversity cases to avoid resolution of significant state-law claims, while
Younger cases almost always involve predominant federal constitutional issues. Younger ab-
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As with the other forms of abstention, plaintiffs face significant costs
when a federal court invokes Burford abstention. If the parties are di-
verse, an out-of-state plaintiff loses the right to litigate his claim in a
federal forum free of local bias. The state courts presumably do not have
greater expertise than the federal courts as to any federal issues involved,
and the state courts may be hostile to the vindication of federal rights.212
In addition, the federal courts have not limited Burford abstention to
cases exhibiting Burford's unusual characteristics. 213 Lower federal
courts have abstained without any reference to whether federal relief
would disrupt state policies.214 Furthermore, many courts have not re-
stention generally is not applied in the absence of a pending state proceeding, see Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), while Burford has no such requirement.
212. Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits Challenging State Administrative De-
cisions: The Scope of the Burford Doctrine, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 971, 993-94 (1979).
213. The Supreme Court encouraged this result by its decision in Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). The Alabama Public Service Commission had
denied Southern Railway's application to discontinue an uneconomical rail service on the
grounds that the public needed the service and Southern had not attempted to reduce its losses
by cutting costs. Southern then began a federal diversity action, alleging that the Commis-
sion's order confiscated its property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. A three-judge court enjoined the Commission from enforcing its order, but the
Supreme Court reversed and ordered abstention. Id. at 342-44, 351.
The Court cited Burford and listed a number of factors in support of abstention. The case
involved "the essentially local problem of balancing the loss to the railroad from continued
operation of trains ... with the public need for that service." Id. at 347-48. In addition,
Alabama had concentrated judicial review of Commission orders in the circuit court of Mont-
gomery County, and appellate review of circuit court decisions was relatively broad under
Alabama law. Id. at 348. The Court ended with a sweeping endorsement of abstention:
As adequate state court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly
local factors is available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary
for protection of federal rights. Equitable relief may be granted only when the Dis-
trict Court... is convinced that the asserted federal right cannot be preserved except
by granting the "extraordinary relief of an injunction in the federal courts."
Id. at 349-50 (quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 614, 615
(1940) (footnotes omitted).
Although Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n bears a superficial resemblance to Burford, several
critical differences directly affect the propriety of abstention. In Burford, federal involvement
was said inevitably to involve serious disruption of state efforts to regulate the East Texas oil
field. In Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, however, the Court said only that the issue was local
and did not dicuss whether federal review of Commission orders would impinge on important
state interests. In Burford, concentration of judicial review was important because it fostered
expertise and reduced the chances of inconsistent decisions, but Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
claimed no such results from concentration of judicial review. Finally, the Court's sweeping
statement seems to authorize abstention in virtually any case seeking review of a state adminis-
trative order so long as the plaintiffs federal claims can be pursued in state court. This sugges-
tion plainly goes well beyond the holding of Burford. For other assessments critical of
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, see M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 245-46; Field, supra note 99,
at 1154-59; Wells, supra note 132, at 75-76; Comment, supra note 212, at 976-78.
214. See, e.g., Garrett v. Bamford, 582 F.2d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1978); Gray-Taylor, Inc. v.
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quired concentration of state judicial review or special knowledge on the
part of state judges as preconditions for abstention.215 In these circum-
stances, federal courts deny rights or defer their enforcement simply be-
cause federal judges do not feel like deciding cases properly before them.
If Burford abstention is retained at all, it should be sharply curtailed
to apply only in circumstances that can overcome the presumption favor-
ing enforcement of rights. Federal review of a state administrative deci-
sion must pose a substantial likelihood of serious harm to important state
interests. As in Burford, the harm must result from federal court in-
volvement per se. State remedies must be genuinely fair and adequate, as
evidenced by concentration of state judicial review in a special forum or
by other special circumstances. Even if these conditions are satisfied,
however, Burford abstention probably violates separation of powers prin-
ciples because a federal court refuses to hear a case properly assigned to
it by Congress. 216 This problem might be circumvented if a court re-
tained jurisdiction as in Pullman and Thibodaux abstention. But signifi-
cant delay in exercising jurisdiction also violates separation of powers
principles,217 and delay is inevitable in Burford cases because a federal
court cannot realistically use a certification process to obtain a speedy
determination of key issues by the highest state court.2 18 Federal courts
might better accommodate the plaintiff's interest in enforcement of
rights and the state's interest in avoiding disruptive interference by exer-
Harris County, 569 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); Kelly
Servs. v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976); Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135,
1143 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 232 n.4 (1st Cir.
1979) (requiring showing of potential interference with state interests as condition for absten-
tion); Allegheny Airlines v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237, 241-42, 245 (3d
Cir. 1972) (same), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
215. See, e.g., Kelly Servs. v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976); Urbano v. Board of
Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 253-57 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970). But see
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 233-34 (1st Cir. 1979) (noting concentration of
review and expertise of state judges in approving abstention); Stallworth v. City of
Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236, 240 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (concluding state courts had special com-
petence over issues being litigated).
216. See Redish, supra note 96 (contending that abstention doctrines ignore the dictates of
valid jurisdictional and civil rights statutes and thus usurp legislative authority in violation of
separation of powers principles).
217. Id. at 90, 98.
218. Certification is helpful when a specific provision of state law is ambiguous and can be
clarified by the highest state court. However, courts in Burford cases abstain because they are
uncertain how a complex state regulatory scheme should apply in the case at hand. Certifica-
tion in these circumstances would require sending the whole dispute to the state supreme court
for review of the state administrative agency's fact-finding and decision. Instead of clarifying
an uncertain state law, the state high court would be performing the function normally per-
formed by the state court with original jurisdiction over the case.
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cising jurisdiction but proceeding with caution. 219 If federal court review
of a particular kind of state administrative ruling would have an unset-
tling effect per se, the court might impose a higher burden on the party
seeking review. Such a course would reduce the threat of disruption
while providing for vindication of rights in egregious cases.
(4) Conclusion
The Supreme Court Should reevaluate all of the abstention doctrines
in light of a presumption favoring enforcement of rights. Younger ab-
stention should be abandoned and Burford abstention probably should be
discarded as well. Pullman and Thibodaux abstention should be sharply
limited as suggested above. The purposes underlying the doctrines
should be recast as factors to consider in the wise exercise of equitable
discretion. The federal courts should proceed with caution and care
when federal relief might interfere with important state policies or pro-
grams. In many cases, of course, no interference will occur because the
plaintiff will lose on the merits or otherwise fail to satisfy the require-
ments for equitable relief. In cases in which an injunction is necessary to
enforce a plaintiff's rights, the courts should structure relief in a way that
causes as little interference with state interests as possible.220
It would be preferable for the Supreme Court itself to revoke or
restrict the abstention doctrines because the Court created them. But if
the Supreme Court fails to act, Congress should overrule Younger and
Burford abstention legislatively, and codify Pullman and Thibodaux ab-
stention as properly limited. Given its power to regulate the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts, Congress certainly can enact such legislation
without running afoul of separation of powers principles.221 Congress
has the power to open the federal courts to certain kinds of cases within
article III limits. If the courts refuse to hear those cases, Congress can
legitimately reaffirm its earlier directives.222
219. The four dissenting justices in Burford thought this an adequate means of protecting
state interests. Burford, 319 U.S. at 345 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
220. Institutional reform litigation has spawned an extensive literature on techniques for
minimizing the intrusive effects of federal injunctions on state institutions. See generally
Zeigler, supra note 93, at 85-110; Special Project, supra note 93; Note, supra note 93.
221. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 448-50 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 152, at 309-75; M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 7-34; C.
WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 32-39.
222. Congress might lack the power to abrogate or modify the abstention doctrines if the
doctrines are constitutionally required, but it is unlikely that they are. The Court character-
ized its reasons for abstention in Pullman only as "important considerations of policy in the
administration of federal equity jurisdiction." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501 (emphasis added). In
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Precedent exists for congressional rejection of court-created absten-
tion doctrines. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,223 a diversity
case, a Cuban governmental agency brought suit against a New York
corporation that refused to pay for a shipment of sugar. The defendant
instead proposed to pay American citizens who owned the sugar before it
was expropriated by the Cuban government. The lower federal courts
held that the expropriation violated international law and thus did not
convey good title to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed and
granted judgment for the plaintiff, relying on the Act of State doctrine,
which "precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the valid-
ity of public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed
within its own territory. 2 24 Shortly after the Supreme Court decision,
Congress enacted legislation restricting the doctrine to limited circum-
stances.2 2 5 The legislation was held to be retroactive and, following the
congressional mandate, the Second Circuit denied Cuba's claim to the
sugar when the case was remanded.226
Codification might limit Pullman and Thibodaux abstention to ap-
propriate cases.2 27 However, a statute defining the narrow circumstances
both Thibodaux and Burford, the Court made clear that it ordered abstention as a matter of
judicial discretion. See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30 ("The District Court was thus exercising a
fair and well-considered judicial discretion in staying proceedings .... ); Burford, 319 U.S. at
317-18 ("[A] federal equity court ... may, in its sound discretion . .. 'refuse to enforce or
protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest.' ") (quoting
United States ex. rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933)).
Some of Justice Black's language in Younger might be taken to create a constitutional
basis for Younger abstention. For example, he suggested that one reason for restraining fed-
eral courts from interfering with state criminal proceedings "is a proper respect for state func-
tions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments." Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. Justice Black went on to state: "[O]ne familiar with
the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect
those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of 'Our Federalism.'" Id. At other points in
the opinion, however, he refers to the "longstanding public policy" against federal court inter-
ference with state court proceedings, id. at 43, thus suggesting that Younger abstention is not
constitutionally mandated. The Younger doctrine has generally been viewed as reflecting a
judicially developed policy of self-restraint and as a doctrine of discretion. See Zeigler, supra
note 105, at 269-70.
223. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
224. Id. at 400-01.
225. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
226. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 185 (2d Cir. 1967).
227. The American Law Institute suggested codification of a number of abstention doc-
trines in 1969, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 157, at 48-51, 282-98, but the
proposals were not adopted by Congress. Bills also were introduced in the late 1970s to over-
rule Supreme Court decisions that extended Younger abstention to state-initiated civil proceed-
ings in situations in which the state proceeding was filed after a federal case had been initiated.
These bills also were unsuccessful. For discussion of these bills, see Committee on Civil
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in which abstention is appropriate necessarily will contain imprecise lan-
guage and could thus be subject to manipulation by federal courts seek-
ing to avoid cases properly brought before them. As Justice Frankfurter
once stated, however, "[i]t would imply an unworthy conception of the
federal judiciary to give weight to the suggestion that acknowledgement
of th[e] power [to abstain] will tempt some otiose or timid judge to shuffle
off responsibility." 228 Thus, if the Supreme Court fails to act, codification
should be tried.
This subsection has applied the new approach to the enforcement of
rights to the abstention doctrines. With some limited exceptions, it con-
cludes that the purposes underlying abstention are insufficient to over-
come the presumption in favor of enforcement of rights. The following
subsection applies the new approach to the new restrictive standards for
the implication of private rights of action under federal statutes.
B. The Restrictive Standards for Implying Private Rights of Action Under
Federal Statutes
The traditional rules for implying a private remedy from a statute
were set forth in the first Restatement of Torts.229 If a person breached a
statutory duty, a court would provide a remedy for the injured party if he
was a member of the group for whose benefit the statute was enacted and
if the harm suffered was of a kind the statute generally was intended to
prevent, unless the legislature indicated that it did not intend a private
remedy under the circumstances. 230 The federal courts have generally
abided by these standards throughout our history.231 As recently as
1975, in Cort v. Ash, 232 the Court used a four-part test for implication of
a private right of action essentially restating the traditional criteria.233
Rights, Imposing Liability upon Governments for Civil Rights Violations and Imposing Limits
upon Younger v. Harris: Pending Legislation to Amend 42 US.C. § 1983, 33 REc. A.B. CITY
N.Y. 141 (1978); Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25
Loy. L. REV. 659, 700-01, 708 (1979); Maroney & Braveman, "Averting the Flood". Henry J.
Friendly, The Comity Doctrine, and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (pt. 2), 31 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 469, 518-40 (1980).
228. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
229. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 285-288 (1934).
230. Id. §§ 286-287. Section 286 is quoted supra note 53.
231. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
232. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
233. The test is as follows:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted," that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the
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Cort v. Ash was the last Supreme Court case to apply the traditional
rules. Three cases decided in 1979 signalled a change to a far more re-
strictive standard.234 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,2 35 the plaintiff
alleged that she had been denied admission to medical school because of
her sex. She brought suit under a federal statute that prohibited sex dis-
crimination by educational institutions receiving federal funds.236 The
statute did not, however, specifically create a private right of action en-
forceable by a person injured by violation of the law.
Although the Court implied a private right of action, the Justices'
opinions revealed dissatisfaction with the traditional standards. With lit-
tle fanfare, the majority recast Cort by framing the issue as one of "statu-
tory construction" and stating: "[B]efore concluding that Congress
intended to make a remedy available to a special class of litigants, a court
must carefully analyze the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative
of such an intent." 237 This language suggests that the relatively narrow
question of statutory interpretation posed by the second Cort factor-
whether Congress intended to create or deny a private right of action-is
the predominant inquiry, and that the other factors are only aids to con-
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added in Cort opinion).
Some commentators believe that the Cort test is more restrictive than the traditional im-
plication requirements. See, e.g., Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 559-
62 (1981); Greene, Judicial Implication ofRemedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Sep-
aration of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469, 479 (1980); Pillai, Negative Implication: The
Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1978).
Others disagree. See, e.g., Ashford, Implied Causes ofAction Under Federal Laws: Calling the
Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 227, 242-42 (1984); Brown, Of Activism and Erie-
The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69
IOWA L. REV. 617, 629-30 (1984). My own view is that Cort did not represent a major depar-
ture from prior law. The first three factors focus on different aspects of legislative intent that
were considered by courts, at least implicitly, as early as Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193,
1195 (K.B. 1854). See supra notes 45-51 & 56 and accompanying text. Arguably, however, the
federalism concerns of the fourth factor are new. See Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under
Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation,
and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333, 1359 (1980).
234. The story of the demise of traditional standards for implication of private rights of
action in the federal courts has been told in detail many times, so only a very brief account of
the central cases is presented here. For more detailed accounts, see Brown, supra note 233, at
629-35; Foy, supra note 54, at 556-66; Mezey, Judicial Interpretation of Legislative Intent: The
Role of the Supreme Court in the Implication of Private Rights ofAction, 36 RUTGERS L. REV.
53, 63-76 (1983).
235. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
236. Id. at 680-83. The statute was 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
237. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
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sider in answering that question. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehn-
quist sought to put Congress on notice that creation of rights of action is
Congress' responsibility. He warned that in the future the Court might
be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action without explicit evi-
dence that Congress intended this result.238 Justice Powell filed a lengthy
dissenting opinion attacking the Cort test as a violation of separation of
powers principles. 239
The Court adopted the restrictive approach suggested in Cannon in
two subsequent cases. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,240 the Court
refused to imply a right of action under section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of customers of a brokerage firm against
accountants who conducted a faulty audit of the firm's records. Citing
Cannon, the Court stated that "our task is limited solely to determining
whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted"
by the plaintiffs. 241 The plaintiffs' argument for implication based on tort
principles therefore was "entirely misplaced. ' 242 The Court also explic-
itly stated that the four Cort factors are not of equal weight, and that the
central inquiry was whether Congress intended to create a private right
of action.243 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis244 reaffirmed the
new approach. In a complex opinion, the Court implied a private right
of action under one section of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and
declined to do so under another section. But the standards the Court
applied were clearly stated:
[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to
create the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made
clear. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, . . . Cannon v. University of
Chicago .... We accept this as the appropriate inquiry to be made in
resolving the issues presented by the case before us. 245
Thus, the new standard was firmly in place.246
238. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Stewart joined in this opinion.
239. Id. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). This theory is discussed infra notes 272-77 and
accompanying text. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, also dissented, arguing that
the legislative history showed Congress did not intend to create a private right of action. Can-
non, 441 U.S. at 718-30.
240. 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
241. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 575. The Court refused to consider the plaintiffs' argument that the third and
fourth Cort factors favored implication, stating that "such inquiries have little relevance to the
decision of this case." Id.
244. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
245. Id. at 15-16.
246. Some subsequent Supreme Court opinions have suggested that the four-part Cort test
still has vitality. The determinative factor, however, is whether Congress intended to create
the asserted right of action. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct.
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of the change made in Can-
non, Touche Ross, and Transamerica. The Court brushed aside hundreds
of years of common-law tradition and dealt a severe blow to the vindica-
tion of rights. Few private rights of action will be implied from federal
statutes under the new standards. If a statute does not explicitly author-
ize a private remedy, the legislative record rarely will show that Congress
intended to create one. Without this positive showing, the Court will
decline to provide a private right of action.247 Without a remedy, the
correlative duties imposed by the statute become mere voluntary
obligations. 248
Only two possible avenues exist for private enforcement of federal
statutory rights in cases in which the federal courts will not imply a
cause of action under the new test. The plaintiff might attempt to pro-
ceed in federal court if an appropriate state cause of action can be cou-
pled with the substantive federal right. Alternatively, the plaintiff might
attempt to enforce the federal right in state court.
The Supreme Court recently closed the first avenue in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson.249 The plaintiffs sued Merrell Dow in
state court alleging that their children had suffered birth defects from
defendant's drug. The plaintiffs relied upon several common-law theo-
ries of liability, including negligence. The plaintiffs also alleged that the
drug was misbranded in violation of the federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act 250 because its label did not provide adequate warnings, and
that the violation of the federal statute was evidence of negligence. Mer-
rell Dow removed the case to federal court, arguing that the court had
subject matter jurisdiction because the presence of the federal issue made
3229, 3234 (1986) (the four-part test is the means by which congressional intent to create a
cause of action is discerned); Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984) (same);
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (same); California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1981) (same). George Brown has argued that the law of implied
rights of action is unpredictable and chaotic because the Supreme Court clings to the form of
Cort while in fact adopting a much more restrictive approach. Brown, supra note 233, at 635.
247. See Foy, supra note 54, at 556 (The Court has gone "from a venerable philosophical
position, under which implied private rights resulted from basic principles of Anglo-American
justice, to a new position, under which implied private rights probably did not, and probably
cannot, exist.").
248. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. This does not mean, of course, that
the statute is a dead letter. In some instances the plaintiff's rights may be enforceable by an
administrative agency. In addition, the statute may contain criminal sanctions that will deter
others from violating plaintiff's rights. The plaintiff may not be able to convince the agency to
act, however, and criminal sanctions do nothing to compensate the plaintiff for violations of
his rights,
249. 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986).
250. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-695 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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the case one arising under federal law.2 51 The Supreme Court disagreed,
and ordered the case remanded to state court.
The parties agreed that a private right of action could not be implied
under the federal Act. Based on this stipulation, the Court assumed that
the Touche Ross-Transamerica standards for implication could not be
met. The Court treated this assumption as the equivalent of a finding
that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action. The
Court then concluded that it would flout, or at least undermine, congres-
sional intent to exercise federal question jurisdiction to provide a private
remedy by use of a state cause of action.2 52
The Merrell Dow Court's reasoning is subject to challenge on several
grounds. Denial of subject matter jurisdiction in this instance is inconsis-
tent with decisions upholding federal jurisdiction when an important is-
sue of federal law is central to a case.253 In addition, it does not
necessarily follow that Congress affirmatively intended to withhold a pri-
vate remedy simply because the Touche Ross-Transamerica standards
are not met. A private right of action cannot be implied under those
standards unless a party can point to specific proof in the legislative his-
tory that Congress intended to create such a remedy. But the legislative
record may be silent on the matter.254 If the record is silent, Congress
may not have considered whether it wanted to create a private right of
action. It may have had no intent one way or the other. Consequently,
allowing the case to go forward in federal court on a state cause of action
does not necessarily contradict congressional intent. Moreover, as Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out in dissent, even if Congress did not intend a
private federal cause of action under the federal Act, it does not necessar-
ily follow that Congress meant to prohibit federal jurisdiction over a state
cause of action that incorporates federal law.2 55 Congress granted fed-
eral question jurisdiction to promote correct and uniform decision of fed-
eral issues, and that purpose would be furthered by exercising
jurisdiction in cases such as Merrell Dow. 256 Justice Brennan also noted
that all express remedies provided by the Act must be pursued in federal
251. Merrell Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 3231.
252. Id. at 3234-35.
253. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 68-72 (1978);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-85 (1946); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 199-200 (1921).
254. As the Supreme Court has noted, the record will often be silent because the legisla-
tion in question concededly does not provide an explicit right of action. See Transamerica, 444
U.S. at 18; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
255. Merrell Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 3241-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 3243 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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court. This preference for federal enforcement undercut the majority's
conclusion that Congress intended private remedies for violations of the
Act to be pursued in state court.257
Despite its questionable logic, Merrell Dow is the new law of the
land, and it prevents a party from enforcing a federal statutory right in
federal court by means of a state cause of action when the Touche Ross-
Transamerica standards do not allow implication of a private federal
cause of action.258 If a federal statutory right is to have any private rem-
edy when Congress does not make plain that it intends to create a private
right of action, the plaintiff must seek to enforce the federal right in state
court. A state judge should not imply a cause of action directly under
the federal statute unless a federal judge would do the same. Federal law
governs that issue, and the supremacy clause presumably requires a state
judge to follow the Touche Ross-Transamerica standards.25 9 However, a
257. Id. at 3244-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
258. Merrell Dow did not address whether a federal court should proceed if subject matter
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship instead of federal question. The answer to this
question is of more than academic interest; some federal courts have allowed federal rights to
be enforced by means of a state-created cause of action in diversity cases factually similar to
Merrell Dow. See, e.g., Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1379-81 (5th Cir. 1980)
(applying Alabama law, court reinstated verdict based on violation of federal National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982), in negligence action despite
lower court determination that no federal private right of action should be implied from the
federal act under the Cort v. Ash test); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F.
Supp. 961, 964-65 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (court used Wisconsin standards based on § 286 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) in deciding that violation of labelling requirements
of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 352-353 (1980), established negli-
gence per se).
The majority in Merrell Dow reasoned that it would undermine congressional intent for a
federal court to provide a private remedy using a state cause of action when Congress had not
intended to create a federal private cause of action. 106 S. Ct. at 3234. This rationale would
seem to apply regardless of the ground of subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand,
Merrell Dow presented a genuinely close question as to whether federal question jurisdiction
existed under traditional jurisdictional standards, and this appeared to be an important factor
in the Court's decision. The Court stated:
We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should be no
federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congres-
sional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element
of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal question
jurisdiction.
Id. at 3236. Diversity cases, by contrast, generally do not present close jurisdictional ques-
tions. If diversity of citizenship existed between the parties, it would be difficult for the
Supreme Court to hold that it lacked jurisdiction. Of course, the Court might nonetheless
decline to hear the case on the policy grounds stated in Merrell Dow. Perhaps we are about to
witness the creation of yet another abstention doctrine.
259. Cf M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 124 ("If the federal system is to function properly,
a state court cannot be permitted to ignore federal constitutional and statutory principles that
conflict with state law. The supremacy clause does not appear to permit any other result.").
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state court may be able to adopt the standard of conduct contained in the
federal statute and enforce the federal statutory right by using a state
cause of action. In traditional parlance, violation of the federal statute
would be evidence of negligence or negligence per se under state com-
mon law. 26°
Federal law would not require a state court to allow this tactic. If
Touche Ross and Transamerica compel the conclusion that Congress did
not intend to create a private remedy, it is hard to argue that Congress
meant to require the state courts to provide private remedies. 261 Federal
law also might prohibit a state court from providing a private remedy if
Congress intended to preempt state enforcement. But if preemption was
not intended, a state court should be free to enforce federal rights by
means of a state cause of action.262
Whether a'plaintiff who is denied a federal remedy by the doctrine
of Touche Ross and Transamerica may enforce his federal right in state
court depends, of course, on the vagaries of local practice.263 Further-
more, after Merrell Dow, state courts may be less willing to enforce fed-
eral rights by means of a state cause of action. Since Merrell Dow held
260. The majority in Merrell Dow did not discuss this possibility. By remanding the case to
the state court, however, the Court appeared to contemplate that the plaintiffs would enforce
the federal right in state court. The plaintiffs could benefit from the federal standard in state
court only by coupling the federal right with a state cause of action because the Court held that
no federal cause of action existed.
261. Indeed, some question remains as to whether state courts must always enforce federal
causes of action that Congress has explicitly created. See M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 124-
38; C. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 268-73.
262. Frankel, supra note 233, at 564 n.64. Some cases support this practice. See, eg.,
Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1379-80 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that violation
of federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1982), is negligence per se under Alabama law); Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 255-
58 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that violation of MVSA was evidence of negligence under Georgia
law); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 n.5 (8th Cir. 1968) (stating that
breach of MVSA may constitute negligence per se under state law); Florida Freight Terminals
v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. App. 1978) (violation of federal air regulations is
evidence of negligence under Florida law); Locicero v. Interpace Corp., 83 Wis. 2d 876, 884,
266 N.W.2d 423, 427 (1978) (violation of federal legislative or administrative enactments can
constitute negligence per se under Wisconsin law).
263. Professor Foy considers this a "strange and disquieting" prospect:
As if determining the adjudicatory consequences of state legislative action were not
difficult enough (given the confusion in the law of the states), the nation is now con-
fronted with an arrangement in which the implicit adjudicatory consequences offed-
eral legislative action will be determined or obscured by the rules of the fifty states,
whatever they may be.
Foy, supra note 54, at 569. Another commentator who reviewed current state practice on
implication of private rights of action concluded that state court rulings have been unpredict-
able and that the law is in disarray. See Note, Implication of Implied Causes of Action in the
State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1244, 1261 (1978).
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that federal court enforcement of a state cause of action predicated on a
federal standard would undermine Congress' intent not to create a pri-
vate remedy, a state judge might well conclude that it would also under-
mine congressional intent to allow a plaintiff to proceed in state court
under the same procedural alignment.
It would be unfortunate if state judges reached this conclusion be-
cause state court actions are the only remaining means of enforcing fed-
eral rights in cases that do not meet Touche Ross-Transmaerica
standards. Also, as noted above, Merrell Dow's inferences about con-
gressional intent to deny a private federal cause of action and thus to
deny federal jurisdiction are shaky at best.264 As a general matter, a state
judge should conclude that Congress does not want federal rights en-
forced in state court only if Congress says so directly by preempting state
enforcement.
Merrell Dow and the Court's restrictive standards for implication of
private rights of action present substantial obstacles to enforcement of
federal statutory rights. The Court has offered two main justifications for
the new standards. One is based on policy concerns; the other is consti-
tutional. A majority of the Justices agree that it is far better for Congress
rather than the courts to create rights of action.265 Congress has superior
law-making powers. It is much more capable than a court to gather
facts, establish priorities, and accommodate varying viewpoints in setting
the enforcement provisions of regulatory statutes. 266 In addition, the
Court has stated that the complexity of modem legislation requires reli-
ance on Congress. 267 Intricate policy calculations may be necessary to
adjust and coordinate the enforcement mechanisms of complex legisla-
tion, and judicial creation of rights of action may disrupt a delicate bal-
264. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
265. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
266. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Judge
Henry J. Friendly once summarized a legislature's advantages in making law:
The legislature's superior resources for fact gathering; its ability to act without await-
ing an adventitious concatenation of the determined party, the right set of facts, the
persuasive lawyer, and the perceptive court; its power to frame pragmatic rules de-
parting from strict logic, and to fashion a broad new regime or to bring new facts
within an existing one; its practice of changing law solely for the future in contrast to
the general judicial reluctance so to proceed; and, finally, the greater assurance that
a legislative solution is not likely to run counter to the popular will: all these give the
legislature a position of decided advantage, if only it will use it.
Friendly, The Gap in Law-Making-Judges Who Can't and tegislators Who Won't, 63
COLUM. L. Rayv. 787, 791-92 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
267. Merrell Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 3234; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982).
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ance.268 The Court has also argued that the new standards will help
reduce federal court caseloads. 269 Moreover, judicial creation of reme-
dies may deflect judicial resources from enforcement of causes of action
that Congress has explicitly created, thus distorting congressional priori-
ties.270 Finally, Justice Powell has suggested that the Cort test invites
Congress to avoid resolution of controversial enforcement issues by leav-
ing them to the courts. 271
Several of the Justices believe that the traditional standards for im-
plication of private rights of action violate separation of powers princi-
ples.272 According to this view, Congress alone has the power to create
private rights of action. Judicial creation of a cause of action is undemo-
cratic because it circumvents the majoritarian political process.2 73 It also
impermissibly expands the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts by extending judicial power to a dispute that Congress has not
given the courts authority to resolve.274 In addition, Erie Railroad v.
268. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting). See Frankel, supra note 233, at 570-84 (arguing that private compen-
satory actions are ill-suited to the deterrence system of the securities laws and may hamper the
central purposes of those statutes); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1206-07 (arguing that
judicial creation of private rights of action may usurp an administrative agency's responsibility
for enforcement of a statute and decrease legislative control over enforcement activity).
269. See Merrell Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 3234; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982).
270. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
271. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Some commentators have suggested that crass political maneuvering may underlie a legislative
decision to omit private rights of action from a statute:
[As to] social legislation that places the burden of progress on those whom it regu-
lates, a very low prospect of effectiveness may be the sine qua non of winning enact-
ment of the law at all.... Contrary to the instrumentalist canon, the ineffectiveness
of a law to achieve its goal may be itself a policy, a policy shared by the act's oppo-
nents and some of its supporters, and may be the price for permitting the law to
reach enactment.
... People have reasons for wanting a law, and the lawmaker will see a value in
meeting their wishes, quite apart from any practical good it may do.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. RE. 197, 233 (1976).
272. Justice Powell first presented this argument in a lengthy dissent in Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting), but no other Justices
joined in the opinion. When Justice Powell dissented on the same grounds in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 395-409 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting),
however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. See also Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 251-55 (1979) (Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting on separation of powers grounds in case implying private right of
action under the fifth amendment). Whether Chief Justice Burger's retirement will change the
alignment on this issue is unclear.
273. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 745-46 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union,
457 U.S. 15, 30 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Tompkins2 75 explicitly restricted the power of the federal courts to de-
clare rules of general common law. Consequently, while it may have
been permissible in 1916 in Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Rigsby276 to
enforce a federal statutory standard by means of a federal common-law
negligence cause of action, this practice is improper today.277 The Cort v.
Ash test thus is seen to invite unconstitutional judicial law-making.
Neither the policy arguments nor the constitutional arguments for
the restrictive implication standards can withstand close scrutiny. Con-
sequently, they cannot overcome the presumption favoring enforcement
of rights in cases that satisfy the traditional implication standards. The
policy arguments are weak at best. Few would disagree that Congress is
better situated than the federal courts to make law. Congress can legis-
late comprehensively and prospectively, and can create administrative
agencies to implement and monitor policy. But this argument misses the
point. A court does not legislate at large when it creates a private right
of action. Instead, it makes the relatively narrow decision to grant a
judicial remedy to enforce a right that Congress has already created. At
this stage in the law-making process, a court's perspective often will be
superior. Congress cannot anticipate all of the situations in which a law
may apply, and thus it cannot always specify in advance the precise rem-
edy that justice requires. 278 A court, on the other hand, can assess the
actual effectiveness of an enforcement mechanism chosen by Congress, 279
and decide whether creation of a private right of action in a specific case
would further or interfere with congressional purposes. Therefore, when
faced with congressional silence, a court should not ask simply whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action on behalf of a partic-
ular plaintiff. Instead, it should also ask whether Congress, if it had con-
sidered this situation, would have wanted the plaintiff to have a private
right of action.28 0 The new standards for implication improperly pre-
275. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
276. 241 U.S. 33 (1916); see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
277. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 401 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36-38 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
278. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527,
529 (1947) ("The intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence after enactment of situa-
tions not anticipated by the most gifted legislative imagination, reveal doubts and ambiguities
in statutes that compel judicial construction."); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1229;
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Greenawalt,
Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REv. 991, 1004 (1977).
279. Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1393 (1975).
280. Ashford, supra note 233, at 267; Frankfurter, supra note 278, at 539; Westen & Leh-
man, Is There Lifefor Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 334-35 (1980).
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elude a court from supplementing a remedial scheme that proves inade-
quate to accomplish clear congressional purposes. 281
The argument that courts may accidentally upset the delicate bal-
ance of statutory enforcement provisions is also unpersuasive. 282 Decid-
ing whether to create a private right of action is not intrinsically more
sensitive or complex than other tasks that the courts undertake.28 3 The
legislative history of federal statutes is preserved in hearing minutes and
legislative reports, and a court can delve as deeply as necessary to deter-
mine whether implication of a private remedy would interfere with con-
gressional purposes. Moreover, statutory enforcement provisions are not
always finely tuned. Congress often leaves a great deal of discretion to
administrative agencies in selecting sanctions because Congress cannot
anticipate the exact activity that should be proscribed. 284 The argument
that the tightened standards for implication will lighten federal caseloads
also is unpersuasive. If the federal court workload is too heavy, there
obviously are better ways to address the problem than by refusing to
enforce people's rights. 285
Justice Powell's argument that the traditional standards for implica-
tion encourage congressional buck-passing presents a closer question.
Ultimately, however, political concerns are insufficient to overcome the
presumption in favor of enforcement of rights. Justice Powell made the
argument as follows:
[Cort v. Ash] invites Congress to avoid resolution of the often contro-
versial question whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced
through private litigation. Rather than confronting the hard political
choices involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional ob-
ligation and then leave the issue to the courts to decide. When this
happens, the legislative process with its public scrutiny and participa-
tion has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to everyone
281. Frankel, supra note 233, at 566.
282. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1290-92.
283. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 287 (1980).
284. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1290.
285. As Judge Parker once stated, if "a citizen is entitled to have his disputes adjudicated
in a tribunal of the sovereignty to which he owes allegiance, it is unthinkable that that sover-
eignty should shirk its responsibility and abdicate its proper functions because of a compara-
tively insignificant matter of expense. Congestion should be relieved, if this is necessary, by
creating additional courts ... ." Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It,
18 A.B.A. J. 433, 438 (1932); see also Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our
Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Ju-
risdiction, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 597, 653-55 (1987) (arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule
for federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be justified as a means of controlling federal court
caseloads).
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concerned. 28 6
There is some merit to this point. Proponents of a statute may be
tempted to omit language explicitly creating a private right of action
while creating legislative history that would encourage courts to imply a
private remedy. In some instances, the restrictive standards for implica-
tion may have the salutary effect of inducing Congress to decide whether
to create a private right of action, at least for those situations that Con-
gress is able to foresee. As Justice Frankfurter once remarked, "[t]he
pressure on legislatures to discharge their responsibility with care, under-
standing and imagination should be stiffened, not relaxed. ' 287
Justice Powell's argument, however, proceeds from a somewhat un-
realistic, or at least incomplete, view of the legislative process. While
Congress may in some instances consciously leave the hard choices to the
courts, in many other instances it simply has not anticipated the plain-
tiff's situation. In these circumstances, the restrictive implication stan-
dards will not have the intended salutary effect. In addition, while
legislators may in some cases succeed in the subterfuge of creating a pri-
vate right of action implicitly rather than explicitly, this strategy is not
likely to be successful generally. Once alerted to the game, legislators
who oppose private rights of action under a proposed law can create their
own legislative history suggesting that courts should not create private
rights of action. If a majority does not favor a private cause of action,
legislators can require an explicit declaration to that effect as a condition
for passing the bill. Even under traditional implication standards, if a
court discovers clear legislative intent to deny a private right of action or
sees substantial equivocation on the subject, it will generally decline to
create the cause of action.288
The restrictive standards may also have another unwanted effect.
Knowing that the courts will not be receptive to implying rights of ac-
tion, Congress may feel freer to enact expansive legislation creating new
"rights" without remedies. Constituents and pressure groups seeking
legislation can be mollified, at least temporarily, with no fear that the
courts will actually attempt to enforce the statute. Thus, instead of in-
ducing Congress to make hard remedial choices, the Court's current ap-
proach may encourage Congress to avoid them.
On balance, the traditional standards for implication establish a
healthier relationship between Congress and the federal courts. Under
286. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
287. Frankfurter, supra note 278, at 545.
288. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
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the current standards, the Supreme Court says to Congress, in effect:
"The whole responsibility in formulating remedies is yours and you can
expect no help from us." The traditional criteria, by contrast, allow a
sympathetic, cooperative effort by the courts to work with Congress in
effectuating underlying congressional purposes and goals. The tradi-
tional standards also caution Congress not to create rights that it does
not want enforced because courts will assume rights are to be enforced
unless there is a good reason for not doing so. If the presumption of
enforcement of rights leads Congress to create fewer rights, so be it. So-
ciety does not need more unenforceable and illusory "rights. '2 89 Finally,
it must be remembered that the traditional standards for implication do
not require creation of a right of action for every "right" or interest con-
tained in legislation. The statute must have been enacted for the plain-
tiff's benefit and the harm suffered must be of a kind the statute generally
was intended to forestall. A court will not create a private right of action
if Congress intended otherwise or if private enforcement of a particular
provision would interfere with the overall purposes of the legislation.290
Furthermore, if Congress believes a court made a serious error by creat-
ing a private right of action, Congress can extinguish it.291
The policy arguments in support of the current standards for impli-
cation are insufficient to overcome the presumption favoring enforcement
of rights. The constitutional arguments based on separation of powers
and the Erie doctrine would be sufficient to overcome the presumption if
they were meritorious. But they too are very weak. They have been re-
jected by a majority of the Court 292 and by virtually all of the commen-
tators who have considered them.293
Initially, proponents of the separation of powers argument face a
heavy burden in proving the unconstitutionality of the implication stan-
dards followed since the beginning of the republic.294 The history of sep-
289. Cf Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1258 ("Democratic processes could argua-
bly be strengthened if courts were to insist on procedures that forced Congress to deliver on its
substantive promises.").
290. See supra notes 53 & 56 and accompanying text.
291. M. REDISH, supra note 104, at 97; Stone, supra note 134, at 9.
292. Ashford, supra note 233, at 283; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-76 (1982).
293. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 233, at 622-27; Creswell, The Separation of PowersImpli-
cations of Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L. REv. 973, 979, 989-96 (1983); Foy, supra
note 54, at 572-84; Frankel, supra note 233, at 563-66; Greenawalt, supra note 278, at 1044-45;
Greene, supra note 233, at 487-89; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1220-32; The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, supra note 283, at 287.
294. There are, of course, precedents for overruling practices long thought to be constitu-
tional. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson,
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aration of powers does not assist them in meeting that burden. The
founding fathers recognized that separation of powers could not be rigid
or absolute. Instead, they viewed some blending of powers as necessary
for effective government 295 and adopted the system of checks and bal-
ances to keep each branch of government from overstepping its
bounds. 296 The view that separation of powers forbids a court to create a
private right of action establishes the sort of rigid separation that the
founders cautioned against.2 9 7
The framers also recognized that a government must have the pow-
ers necessary to accomplish its objective.298 Justice Powell's view of sep-
aration of powers contradicts this principle because it denies the federal
courts a necessary power. Because Congress cannot foresee all of the
situations in which a law may apply, the federal courts must be free to fill
statutory interstices to ensure completeness and consistency in federal
law and to provide appropriate remedies. 299 This exercise of judicial
power is not a usurpation of legislative authority, but rather is a neces-
163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
295. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also con-
templates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."); J.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 18 (1978) (Separation of powers has "not preclude[d]
one branch of government from participating in functions assigned primarily to another.").
296. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-13 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See gener-
ally M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 18, 159-75 (1967).
297. Greene, supra note 233, at 487-89.
298. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 194 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("A govern-
ment ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects
committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible
.... "); Id. No. 44, at 285 (J. Madison) ("[W]henever a general power to do a thing is given,
every particular power necessary for doing it is included."); see also Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824) ("[Tjhe legislative, executive, and judicial
powers, of every well constructed government, are ... potentially coextensive.... All govern-
ments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess, within them-
selves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws. If we examine the
constitution of the United States, we find that its framers kept this great political principle in
view.").
299. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law" Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957)
("[S]aparation of powers cannot be watertight; exclusive reliance upon statutory provision for
the solution of all problems is futile."); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 283, at 287
("[A]Ilowing courts to resolve the private liability question requires neither unusual nor un-
democratic exercises of judicial power and, within limits, reflects a sensible allocation of func-
tions between the judiciary and the legislature."); see also Brown, supra note 233, at 623-25;
Greene, supra note 233, at 487-89.
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sary supplement to it.300
Justice Powell also argues that implication of a private right of ac-
tion improperly expands the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court
by extending its authority to a dispute that Congress has not assigned to
it for resolution. 30 1 This argument involves a fundamental misconcep-
tion about the meaning of jurisdiction. The existence or nonexistence of
a remedy does not affect a court's subject matter jurisdiction. When a
plaintiff alleges the denial of a right created by federal law, the case
plainly arises under that law within the meaning of article III and 28
U.S.C. § 1331.302 Moreover, jurisdiction entails the power to grant ap-
propriate remedies. As Justice Harlan once stated, "a court of law vested
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit has the power-and
therefore the duty-to make principled choices among traditional judi-
cial remedies." 30 3 Justice Powell's theory of jurisdiction requires Con-
gress not only to create a right in a person's favor but also to say
explicitly that he can enforce that right. As Professor Foy has noted, "a
jurisdiction which invariably requires the legislature to speak twice in
favor of plaintiffs is a strange jurisdiction indeed. It is dramatically dif-
ferent from the kind of jurisdiction that Anglo-American courts have
actually exercised over the years. ''3°4
The argument that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 30 5 requires a rejection
of traditional standards for implication borders on the frivolous.30 6 Erie
300. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1228-31; Tate, The Law-Making Function of the
Judge, 28 LA. L. RPv. 211, 222 (1968).
301. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 745-46 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
302. But see Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3237 (1986);
supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
303. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 408 n.8 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter elaborated on this principle in Montana-Dakota Utils. Co.
v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951):
Courts... are organs with historic antecedents which bring with them well-defined
powers. They do not require explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to
enforce statutory obligations. A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for
want of a formulated sanction. When Congress has "left the matter at large for
judicial determination," our function is to decide what remedies are appropriate in
the light of the statutory language and purpose and of the traditional modes by which
courts compel performance of legal obligations.
Id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Frankel, supra note 233, at
565-66; Greene, supra note 233, at 487-88.
304. Foy, supra note 54, at 578-79.
305. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
306. This argument has been criticized extensively elsewhere, so it is considered only
briefly here. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 233, at 622-27; Foy, supra note 54, at 583 ("Nor does
the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins have anything to do with the question of implied
private remedies."); Frankel, supra note 233, at 563-66; Hazen, supra note 233, at 1375-82;
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1220-32.
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involved the relationship between federal law and state law, not the rela-
tionship between the federal courts and Congress. Although the decision
extinguished the power of the federal courts to create general federal
common law in areas constitutionally left to state control, the case did
not restrict the power of federal courts to create common law in areas
properly within federal cognizance. 30 7 Consequently, Erie does not pre-
clude a federal court from creating a private right of action under a prop-
erly enacted federal statute.
The arguments in favor of the restrictive standards for implication
of private rights of action are thus insufficient to overcome the presump-
tion favoring enforcement of rights. The Court should therefore aban-
don those standards. If the Court fails to take this step, Congress should
take appropriate action. There are many approaches Congress might
adopt. Congress could enact a general directive requiring the courts to
imply a private right of action on behalf of any person whose rights
under any federal statute are violated. Such a directive, however, would
be most unwise. In some instances, creation of a private right of action
might undermine congressional purposes or distort a carefully balanced
remedial scheme. Courts must determine whether a private right of ac-
tion should exist for statutory violations on a case-by-case basis.
Although Congress cannot responsibly enact a blanket standard, it
could enact a general provision to guide the courts in deciding whether
to imply a private right of action in a particular case. The most logical
standards to adopt are those set forth in Cort v. Ash. 30 8 Cort essentially
collected and restated the traditional criteria for implication of private
remedies. Those criteria worked tolerably well for hundreds of years. If
Congress is not prepared to enact general legislation directing the courts
to apply the Cort v. Ash test, it could instead issue instructions with each
new law it enacts. A series of standard instructions could be included in
a legislative drafting manual. Depending on the statute involved, Con-
gress might direct the federal courts to create a private right of action for
any violation of the statute, direct the courts to use the Cort criteria, or
307. At the very least, effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in
the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or "judicial legislation,"
rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statu-
tory patterns enacted in the large by Congress. In other words, it must mean recog-
nition of federal judicial competence to declare the governing law in an area
comprising issues substantially related to an established program of government
operation.
Mishkin, supra note 299, at 799-800; see also D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
308. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see supra note 233.
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even direct the court not to entertain any causes of action not explicitly
created by Congress. 30 9
Arguably, Congress cannot legitimately direct the courts to follow
particular standards in deciding whether to imply a private right of ac-
tion. In a sense, Congress would be delegating a law-making function to
the federal courts by empowering them to create causes of action, possi-
bly violating separation of powers principles. There appear to be several
answers to this argument. If Congress were to direct the courts to use
the Cort criteria, it would merely be telling the courts to do what they
have traditionally done. Since courts have exercised the power to create
causes of action under the Cort standards in the past, it is hard to see
why it would violate separation of powers principles for Congress to in-
struct them to use those standards in the future. This response may beg
the question, however. While courts may properly decide the scope of
their common-law powers themselves, Congress might be overstepping
its authority in directing the courts to use those powers and in telling
them what the scope of those powers should be. Congress plainly can
affect the interpretive process by defining its terms, 310 but directing the
federal courts to make law goes much further.
309. Congress has given the courts instructions on implying private rights of action on at
least one occasion, in the legislative history of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of
1980. Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77apassim (1981)). The main
purpose of the Act was to reduce the regulatory burdens on small businesses that offered and
traded in securities to aid them in raising capital. Ashford, supra note 233, at 284. Congress
recognized, however, that it must not leave investors unprotected. Id. at 290-91. Committee
reports of both the Senate and the House stated that the reduced regulation should be accom-
panied by increased remedial enforcement by -the Securities Exchange Commission and
through private rights of action. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980); S. REP.
No. 958, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 35 (1980). The House Committee expressly indicated that
the federal courts should use criteria very similar to Cort v. Ash standards in interpreting the
Act:
The Committee wishes to make plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights
of action under this legislation, where the plaintiff falls within the class of persons
protected by the statutory provision in question[, where sluch a right would be con-
sistent with and would further Congress' intent in enacting that provision, and where
such actions would not improperly occupy an area traditionally the concern of state
law.
H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra, at 28-29. The Senate report contained similar but less specific
language. S. REP. No. 958, supra, at 5, 14, 35. For articles analyzing the Act, see Barber,
Alternatives for Small Business Raising Capital Under the Securities Act of 1933, 8 PEP-
PERDINE L. REv. 899 (1981); Riccio, Cheney, Sibears & Garry, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Small Business: An Overview of an Administrative Response to the Capital
Needs of Small Business, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 841 (1983); Comment, The Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980 and Venture Capital Financing, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 865
(1981).
310. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (giving general definitions of terms to
be followed in construing federal statutes).
[Vol. 38
There are precedents for such congressional action, however. Con-
gress has delegated broad law-making power to the federal courts in
other contexts. For example, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,311 the Court held that section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947312 authorized the federal courts to fashion a body
of federal common law governing labor contracts in industries affecting
interstate commerce. 313 If Congress can grant the federal courts broad
power to create substantive law, it follows that Congress also can grant
the courts the narrower power to create remedies to effectuate congres-
sionally created substantive rights and duties.
In addition, Congress has delegated broad law-making authority to
administrative agencies. The authority delegated often includes the
power to set standards of conduct and the discretion to choose among
various remedial measures to enforce administratively promulgated
rules.314 If such delegation is legitimate, it follows that delegation of sim-
ilar power to the courts is legitimate.
Delegation of law-making power in the administrative context is
constitutional if it provides an intelligible principle to guide the agency
receiving the delegation. 315 A direction that the federal courts use the
Cort v. Ash criteria in deciding whether to create a private right of action
satisfies this requirement. Cort v. Ash establishes four criteria for courts
to use in deciding an implication question. The test clearly circumscribes
and guides a court's discretion, establishing intelligible standards for its
exercise. A court's discretion is narrow, channeled, and hedged about on
all sides by legislative choices because Congress created the rights and
corresponding duties. Indeed, when compared with the broad delegation
of power to administrative agencies, delegation of power to the courts to
create a private cause of action under a federal statute seems relatively
modest. This is not to say that the courts' function is unimportant. A
court's decision whether to create a cause of action may determine if the
311. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
312. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
313. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451-52. The federal courts also have construed the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982), as a directive
to develop a substantive body of federal common law governing private claims under employee
benefit plans. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24
n.26 (1983); Woodfork v. Marine Cooks Union, 642 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1981); Reiherzer v.
Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1978).
314. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 44-47 (1971);
Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 315,
323-24, 336 (1976).
315. Greene, supra note 233, at 490-93; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the
Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224, 1229 (1985).
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statute is to have a practical effect or be simply hortatory. Nonetheless, a
congressional direction to use Cort standards would be a relatively lim-
ited delegation of power.
C. A Brief Comparison of the Abstention Doctrines and the Standards for
Implication of Private Remedies
It is useful to compare the two types of impediments to enforcement
of rights addressed in this Article. On one level, the abstention doctrines
and the restrictive standards for implication are consistent. Both result
in the denial of legal rights. On another level, however, they are incon-
sistent. The restrictive implication standards direct courts to focus al-
most exclusively on whether Congress intended to create a private right
of action. The abstention doctrines, by contrast, often require a court to
ignore legislative intent by refusing to entertain a cause of action that
Congress has explicitly authorized. The Court cannot have it both ways.
It should not honor legislative intent in one context while ignoring it in
another. The Justices who argue that separation of powers principles
require the restrictive implication standards generally have supported the
Court's abstention decisions.316 These Justices face a problem in harmo-
nizing their positions. If separation of powers principles require that
Congress alone create remedies, it is as much a violation of those princi-
ples to negate a remedy that Congress has explicitly created as to create
a remedy that Congress has not authorized. 317
This Article has suggested that the Court reverse direction in both
areas either sua sponte or at Congress' command. This proposal raises
the question of whether the author is guilty of a converse inconsistency.
Can the suggestion that the courts limit abstention but imply private
rights of action more freely be harmonized from the standpoint of con-
gressional intent and separation of powers?
Abstention involves a blatant refusal to follow congressional intent
that federal causes of action be heard in federal court. If Congress af-
firmatively directed the judicial branch to stop abstaining, the courts
would be honoring congressional intent by following this directive. But
even if the courts took this step on their own, they would effectuate con-
gressional intent more fully and faithfully than they do at present. Tradi-
tional implication standards, by contrast, require a court to consider
316. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell joined in majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist ordering Younger abstention); Trainor
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447-48 (1977) (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist joined in majority opinion ordering Younger abstention).
317. Redish, supra note 96, at 82 n.58.
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whether the legislative history of a statute reveals an intent to grant the
private right of action in question. These standards also require a court
to consider underlying congressional purposes in deciding if a private
right of action is necessary or appropriate to effectuate those purposes.
Thus, if the courts ceased abstaining and resumed use of the traditional
implication criteria, they would more faithfully follow congressional in-
tent than they do presently.
As to separation of powers, Professor Redish has persuasively
demonstrated that abstention violates separation of powers principles. 318
If the courts stopped abstaining, the violation would cease. Traditional
implication standards, by contrast, do not violate separation of powers
principles, as demonstrated above. 319 Nevertheless, the separation of
powers concerns of some of the Justices might be eased if Congress and
the Court adopt the more cooperative, conciliatory approach that I have
suggested. If Congress directs the Court to follow the Cort criteria in
interpreting some or all statutes, the Justices might be less concerned
that they are exceeding their competence. They would simply be follow-
ing congressional direction. Furthermore, Congress would not be im-
properly delegating law-making authority by directing the courts to
follow the Cort criteria. 320 Thus, if the courts were to cease abstaining
and to imply private rights of action more freely, their actions would be
consistent with respect to both congressional intent and separation of
powers. This would be even clearer if Congress directed these steps.
Conclusion
This Article has demonstrated the importance of the principle that
rights require remedies. It has shown that the principle substantially in-
fluenced the growth of Anglo-American legal institutions, and it has ex-
plained why enforcement of rights is fundamental to democratic
government. The Article also has set forth a new approach to the en-
forcement of rights, and has given examples of how that approach should
be applied.
The abstention doctrines and the restrictive implication standards
are only two of the many barriers to the enforcement of rights developed
by the Burger Court.32 1 The new approach also should be applied in
evaluating other obstructions. In each instance, the courts should begin
with the presumption in favor of enforcement of rights. Unless the de-
318. Redish, supra note 96.
319. See supra notes 292-307 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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fendant can affirmatively demonstrate that the harm to others or to im-
portant governmental interests from enforcement would exceed the harm
to the plaintiff from nonenforcement, the plaintiff's rights should be
vindicated.
Simple justice demands that the new approach be adopted. The
courts should strive to enforce legal rights, not invent ways to deny them.
As Ronald Dworkin has stated, "[i]f we cannot insist that the Govern-
ment reach the right answers about the rights of its citizens, we can insist
at least that it try. We can insist that it take rights seriously, follow a
coherent theory of what these rights are, and act consistently with its
own professions. ' 322 The federal courts would do well to follow this ad-
monition by working to enforce legal rights fully and effectively.
322. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 186 (paper ed. 1978).
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